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The Gulf War of 1990-1991 has been described as the pinnacle of second-wave
warfare, characterized by massed field armies, maneuver formations based on the
armored vehicle and airplane, second generation precision guided munitions (PGMs), and
engagements involving thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. At the height
of the conflict, over 500,000 United States (U.S.) servicemen were deployed in support of
Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The ensuing victory by U.S./Coalition
forces and loss by Iraqi forces is one of the greatest lopsided outcomes in the history of
warfare. Unfortunately, the demonstrated U.S. preeminence in conventional second-wave
warfare may spell trouble for the 21 st century. Potential adversaries will have taken note
of our capabilities in this arena and will endeavor to develop methods and technologies
that will negate our strengths either through asymmetric attack, innovation, or both.
These actions will give rise to asymmetric warfare as the dominant paradigm.
Combined application of special operations forces (SOF), information operations
(IO), and airpower (AP) may produce synergistic effects that will permit smaller forces to
effectively and efficiently counter our adversaries adopting asymmetric warfare. We
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Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character ofwar,
not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes.
Guilio Douhet
A. HYPOTHESIS AND BACKGROUND
The Gulf War of 1990-1991 has been described as the pinnacle of second-wave
warfare (Alvin & Heidi Toffler, 1993, p. 8)', characterized by massed field armies,
maneuver formations based on the armored vehicle and airplane, second generation
precision guided munitions (PGMs), and engagements involving hundreds of thousands
of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. At the height of the conflict, over 500,000 U.S.
military personnel were deployed in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM. The ensuing victory by U.S./Coalition forces and loss by Iraqi forces is one of
the greatest lopsided outcomes in the history of warfare. Unfortunately, the demonstrated
U.S. preeminence in conventional second-wave warfare may spell trouble for the 21st
century. Potential adversaries will have taken note of our capabilities in this arena and
will likely endeavor to develop methods and technologies that will negate our strengths
either through asymmetric attack, innovation, or both. These actions will give rise to
asymmetric warfare as the dominant paradigm for future conflict. Just as the 1920s and
1930s were times of great innovation in military doctrine, strategy, operational concepts,
organization, and technology that broke with contemporary standards, the Armed Forces
of the United States must again look to the future as they develop force structures and
doctrines that can successfully deter and counter this new type of "unconventional
warfare."
This thesis will explore the synergistic effects that can be created through the
combined employment of special operations forces (SOF), information operations (10),
and airpower (AP). Each of these disciplines, guided by distinct operating principles and
defined by unique characteristics, provide capabilities, which if blended properly, may
produce effects greater than their individual strengths (see Table 1.1). It is anticipated
that the effects of a SOFIA 2 (SOF, 10, and AP) doctrine will allow the use of smaller
forces in an engagement to confront a wide array of potential adversaries of the U.S. in
the 21st century. 3
1 The Tofflers postulate that societies conduct warfare in the same manner in which they produce
wealth. In previous works they developed the ideas of "waves," or periods of history characterized by a
dominant wealth producing paradigm. The "first-wave" depends on agriculture, the "second-wave" is
industrial in nature, while the "third-wave" is distinguished by the preeminence of information processing.
The Gulf War was fought as an industrial war by the U.S., hence they see it as mainly a case of second-
wave warfare.
' Doctor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School suggested the term SOFIA based upon
the Greek root of the word, which means "knowledge" and "wisdom". It seems especially appropriate for
our doctrine because of the importance played by information operations in enabling both SOF and AP.
' Unfortunately, the increase in the number of situations requiring the application of military force
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Table 1.1: Characteristics/Tenets/Subsets of SOF, IO, and AP4
Basic SOFIA doctrine calls for the reduction of conventional forces (in most
situations), and replacement with SOF elements, complemented by AP, and enabled by
information operations. Discipline apportionment will be based upon the adversary faced
by the SOFIA task force. 5 With a smaller footprint and greater flexibility than
conventional forces, SOF can access more environments. IO can provide the SOFIA task
force commander with "relative information superiority", and a means of affecting the
opponents information systems and decision-making abilities. Possessing more
4
Source: National Defense University. (1995). What Is Information Warfare? Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Source: [United States Air Force. (1997). Air Force Doctrine Document I, October 1997.]
Source: [United States Special Operations command. (1997). SOF Vision 2020 (Pamphlet).]
5 SOFIA doctrine allows for the lead discipline to change based upon the environment. In some
instances, SOF ground elements may be more applicable to the situation, while in others, AP may play the
decisive role. In all cases, IO will be a force multiplier, but may also have a force applications role.
information about the operating environment than the enemy reduces the SOFIA
commanders "decision cycle." A faster decision cycle affords the SOFIA task force two
benefits: 1. Reduces the amount of factors it need be concerned with, allowing
concentration (both of forces and mental acuity) on areas of primary concern, 6 and 2.
Reduction in number of ground forces required to accomplish the mission. AP provides
the SOFIA commander with battlespace mobility, ISR (intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance) and precision "fires."
Armed forces adopting a SOFIA operational concept will display increased
mobility/reach, flexible/scalable lethality, and increased precision targeting. Where
employed together, SOF, 10, and AP will be able to achieve limited battlespace
superiority. SOFIA induced battlespace superiority will be bounded by the time available
from notification to employment of forces, 7 by the relative information balance between
opponents, and the scope of the operation. "Scope of the operation" includes number of
forces involved, lethality of weapons employed, size of the area of responsibility (AOR),
operational goals and duration of the action. Changes in any of the variables will affect
the ability of SOF, 10, and AP to achieve battlespace superiority.
B. RELEVANCE
Decreasing resources, a shrinking pool of overseas bases for forward presence,
and increasing non-traditional threats/missions necessitate development of a doctrine that
does not rely upon large numbers of troops supplied with heavy equipment for every
"Factors" affecting the operating environment include geography and "information quotient."
Information quotient refers to the amount, complexity, and importance of certain types of information to a
situation.
7
This time would be used for preparation and rehearsal of forces.
4
situation. In spite of recent increases in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget, it is
unlikely the U.S. military will see a return to the $300 billion dollar budgets of the mid-
1980s. If so, it will be imperative to remember the military maxim ''economy of force." A
doctrine that blends the strengths and negates the individual weaknesses of SOF, IO, and
AP may provide a solution that is more effective against our most probable adversaries,
economical in terms of funding and manpower, and flexible enough to provide utility
across the spectrum of conflict.
Since World War II, the United States has organized, trained, and equipped forces
for "worst case" scenarios; nuclear or conventional war with peer competitors.
Paradoxically, it has been postulated (and proven in the case of the U.S.) that the type of
conflict/adversary an armed force trains to fight, is the one most likely to be deterred, and
never engaged 8 . Forty-five years of Cold War with the former Soviet Union is a prime
example.
When confronted with wars not fitting this dominant paradigm, the U.S. has
consistently assumed that forces developed for high-end conflict would be just as capable
in low-end conflicts. Our success rate in applying mismatched styles of war and forces is
ambiguous. The Korean War (1950-1953) resulted in a stalemate that continues to this
day. The Vietnam War (1965-1973) cost the U.S. over 50,000 dead and still the Republic
of Vietnam collapsed. Only when the opponent has fully adopted our paradigm of
conventional, second-wave warfare, have our victories been complete, as in Operations
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
The late Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, stated "History suggests that we most often deter the
conflicts that we plan for and actually fight the ones we do not anticipate" in The Bottom-up Review:
Forcesfor a New Era (September, 1993), Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.
5
Changes in the international system wrought by the demise of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 will continue to affect the face of conflict through
the next century. The dramatic transformation from a bipolar to a multi-polar world has
unleashed forces that were suppressed, ignored, or misunderstood by the U.S. and the
USSR. These forces include ethno-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and quests for
regional hegemony.
All three have the capacity to generate conflict unlike that which the U.S. is
currently prepared to face. Historically called low intensity conflict, operations below
conventional war on the continuum of conflict are actually quite varied and range from
counter-insurgency, to counter-terrorism, to peace operations, to counter-proliferation, to
humanitarian assistance. As such, they require a perspective different from conventional
war, to successfully prosecute. Instead of being thought of as lesser cases of traditional
war, they should be viewed as sui generis. While it is our belief that these types of
conflicts are increasingly more likely, the U.S. must also continue to be prepared to deter
and fight larger scale conflicts, such as those exemplified by the Cold War and the Gulf
War. Without a credible ability to fight and win the big wars, the U.S. invites aggression
from traditional peer competitors employing second-wave warfare technology.
C. METHODOLOGY
Development of an operational concept that encompasses SOF, 10, and AP is
admittedly a large task. In order to convey our vision of combined SOF, 10 and AP
operations, we will adopt an heuristic approach to our subject. First, we will develop a
snapshot of what we believe the operating environment may be like in the year 2010. For
this we will employ the idea of "scenarios," as refined by Peter Schwartz (1996) in his
6
book The Art of The Long View. Our vision of the future is based upon a review of
contemporary issues by a variety of authors. It is not our contention that this is the only
possible future. What we do believe is that this is one of many possible futures that
encompass some worst case scenarios. Following chapters will be structured around
definitions, concepts, "SWOT" (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, & threats) and
utility analyses.
Definitions and concepts provide the reader with a review of commonly used
words and ideas pertaining to the disciplines. A SWOT analysis allows us to determine
both positive and negative attributes of the individual disciplines. The results of our
SWOT analyses will assist us in determining the utility of each discipline, and the overall
robustness of the SOFIA doctrine.
Strengths and weaknesses focus on the internal aspects of the discipline. For
example, an inherent strength of AP is its flexibility. Aircraft can be dynamically
retasked, that is, redirected from preplanned targets to targets of opportunity while in
flight. On the other hand, a primary weakness of AP can be its limited "staying power."
AP platforms tend to have relatively shorter duration times in action than ground forces
due to fuel, ordnance, maintenance requirements, and crew endurance. All of these have
an impact on principles of employment and concepts of operations associated with AP.
Opportunities and threats refer to factors external to the discipline that may effect
our vision. An opportunity associated with 10 is the possibility of decreased friendly and
enemy casualties. Certain techniques associated with 10, such as manipulation of an
adversary's information system, may allow us to achieve national goals without directly
endangering lives. It may be possible to create a false impression, one that is favorable to
7
the U.S., of a contested battlespace and introduce it into an opponents information
system. Decision-makers on the other side may then be influenced to acquiesce without
U.S. forces having to engage in battle.
Threats are those forces that can diminish the effectiveness of the discipline.
Misuse of SOF by political leaders and general-purpose forces (GPF) commanders is an
example of an external threat. A lack of understanding on the part of decision-makers that
control SOF can lead to improper employment, leading to failed missions and waste of
valuable assets. Use of an Army Special Forces company in a regular infantry role by
GPF commanders is an example of a threat.
Robustness is based upon the discipline's ability to function in a variety of roles,
against a variety of adversaries, in a variety of situations. (See Table 1 .2 for a list of
traditional roles and uses for power, two major categories of adversaries, and probable
future situations or missions).
ROLES
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Table 1.2: Roles, Adversaries, and Situations/Missions.
8
Compellence, deterrence, and punishment are traditional "desired effects" of the
use of power (both political and military). Preventive actions are those actions taken to
deny an adversary the ability to develop, deploy, or employ a new capability. The 1982
Israeli airstrike on the Iraqi nuclear power plant at Osirak was designed to prevent
Saddam Hussein's development of nuclear weapons. Preemptive actions are those actions
taken to "spoil" an adversary's planned attack. The 1967 Israeli air attack on the Egyptian
air force destroyed hundreds of aircraft hours prior to the planned invasion of Israel by
Arab forces.
The robustness of our model will depend upon three variables: 1. Type of
competitor (niche or peer); 2. Intensity of the conflict or mission (high intensity or low
intensity); and 3. Wave progression of the opponent (first, second, or third-wave as
described by the Tofflers). (See Figure 1.1) Our conflict visualization tool provides a
graphic representation ofhow we will assess the robustness of our SOFIA doctrine.
For example, how well can a SOFIA task force function against a niche
competitor armed with first-wave technologies, in a low-level guerrilla insurgency? How
well could the same task force fare when pitted against a peer competitor with a









Figure 1.1: Conflict Visualization Tool
Utility is a measure of how well SOF, 10, and AP can accomplish different tasks.
In his book. Explorations in Strategy, Colin Gray (1996) uses four questions to determine
the utility of a discipline: 1. What uniquely, can the discipline do? 2. What can the
discipline do well? 3. What does the discipline do poorly? and 4. What is the discipline
unable to do? (p. 99) By answering these questions we can identify tasks that can be
accomplished by a SOFIA task force, and begin to establish boundaries on the types of
missions they should be assigned. What also will become apparent is that there will be
some overlap with the types of missions that can be accomplished by alternative
combinations of forces. What a SOFIA doctrine must focus on are those tasks that can
best be accomplished by SOFIA forces, and avoid those that can best be accomplished by
others. SOF, 10, and AP are uniquely suited to our envisioned future of asymmetric
warfare, primarily because of the unorthodox and multidimensional reasoning (problem
solving) skills associated with, and the technology inherent in the equipment used by,
10
practitioners of the disciplines. SOF personnel are less constrained by conventional
thinking than GPF soldiers. Through participation in innovative and realistic training,
SOF personnel learn to "put down the manual" and develop new methods of addressing
problems. Limits are removed on what is an "acceptable answer." AP practitioners are
accustomed to thinking in four dimensions (horizontal, vertical, longitudinal & time) vice
the traditional three dimensions of ground forces. 10, as a relatively new concept,
encourages operators to recognize the information quotient of every action. Relative
superiority in information is analogous to achieving air superiority. It allows freedom of
maneuver, while denying it to your opponents.
We have limited discussion of our SOFIA concept through the year 2010 for a
variety of reasons. All three services have published visionary documents that project
through the same time period and beyond, which provides us with some base documents
to build upon and contrast with our vision of the future. It also provides a manageable





In this chapter we will construct a future based upon a review of contemporary
literature. Noted authors such as Samuel Huntington, Heidi and Alvin Toffler, and Peter
Schwartz will be used as primary sources for identifying possible future trends. We
recognize that the ideas and concepts put forward by Huntington and the Tofflers are
controversial, and that there are valid contradictory concerns regarding their ideas. It is
not our contention that this chapter represents the only possible future. It is merely an
attempt to provide the reader with a "worst case" environment in which the SOFIA
doctrine may be applicable.
A. SCENARIO-BASED PLANNING
When dealing with force structure, it is imperative as the late Les Aspin (1993)
said that we get it "not too badly wrong." A too narrowly focused vision of the future
environment, one that fails to take into account key trends or misinterprets their effect,
may generate inflexible concepts with disastrous results. The French and Belgian static
defensive forts of the inter-war years were based upon a vision of the future that was
remarkably similar to the past. On the other hand, German doctrine during the 1930s
reflected thoughtful evaluation of newly proposed concepts and infant technological
advances, which culminated in their development of Blitzkrieg. Visionaries such as B.H.
Liddell-Hart, Heinz Guderian, Billy Mitchell, Guilio Douhet, and William Moffett are
examples of leaders who were able to recognize the coming changes brought about by
advances in technology and were able to think through the possibilities they suggested.
13
Strategic bombing, the aircraft carrier, armored maneuver warfare, combined arms
operations, and close air support are just a few of the results.
Defining your vision of the future is the basis upon which everything rests. So
how do we ensure that our "vision" does not lead to a solution that is "too wrong?"
Volumes have been written concerning strategic planning, but a common theme is
development of a model that will function in a variety of environments. In his book, The
Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz (1996) describes a method based on "scenarios."
Scenario-based planning is a technique that allows you to think about possible futures by
identifying driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties. Developing
plausible future environments from these guideposts allows the strategic thinker to ensure
that their concepts and organizations will not be caught unprepared. At the very least,
they will be more at ease with the situation because they will have thought through the
implications of various scenarios. Best case, organizations and concepts will have been
created and implemented that will allow them to face these future environments.
Driving forces are "the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine
the story's outcome" (Schwartz, 1996, p. 101). Predetermined elements are those events
that will prevail regardless of the scenario envisioned. Critical uncertainties are
"intimately related to the pre-determined elements. You find them by questioning your
assumptions about predetermined elements..." (p. 115). In the following sections we will
identify key driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties that will
most likely impact the .environment in which we expect our SOFIA doctrine to function.
14
1. Driving Forces Affecting the Operating Environment in the Year 2010
Schwartz suggests five broad categories for investigation of key driving forces:
society, technology, economics, politics, and environment. Schwartz counsels that it is
important to cull from your first iteration of driving forces only those that have a direct
impact on your scenario. "Which are significant and will actually influence events?
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Table 2.1: Driving Forces Affecting the Operating Environment in the Year 2010
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a. Society
Paul Moscarelli (1996) in his article "Religion—Banner for Twenty-First
Century Conflict" identifies religious fundamentalism as a driving force that will likely
continue to have a major impact on world events. He describes it as a "...major conduit
of political change in the international arena" and asserts that "...in a world of increasing
complexity, believers are turning to their faiths in ever greater numbers for both moral
guidance and group identification" (p. 31).
Differentiating "fundamentalism" from contemporary religious mores,
Moscarelli (1996) believes "it is a strategy by which believers attempt to preserve their
group identity" and "involves revival of former beliefs which are modified by leaders to
achieve political goals" (p. 33). Key to his definition is the idea that fundamentalist
strategy "is often innovative and rejects secular politics in charismatic fashion to renew
group identity and expand popular support" (p. 33).
Moscarelli (1996) argues that the "morality" aspect of religion provides a
rallying point for political activities. Questions of how power should be distributed and
utilized inevitably fall into categories of good and evil. "Anything that can be portrayed
as evil can be righteously opposed and such opposition can be rationally defended with
religious precepts" (p. 32). This ability to view political struggles in black and white
allows religious fundamentalists to use any means necessary, including violence, to
achieve their ends (triumph of good over evil).
The increase in fundamentalist movements worldwide in the past twenty
years can be seen as a response to the failed policies of secular governments in many first
16
and second-wave societies. Attempts to quickly modernize produced rising expectations,
and when unmet, produced a backlash.
Swept into power by a fear of modernity, fundamentalist leaders have
faced difficulty when forced to put their beliefs into action in the form of a functioning
government. A paradox develops in that the more a fundamentalist government uses
secular methods to solve its domestic and foreign problems, the more it begins to
resemble a secular government. 9 The more it resists "secular solutions", the more it
resembles the failed former government in its ability to provide economic prosperity for
its people. "This no win situation keeps the door open for new fundamentalist or secular
movements to surface and challenge the old" (Moscarelli, 1996, p. 46). The cyclic nature
of these failed governments ensures that fundamentalism will continue to produce
conflict in many areas of the world for years to come.
In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Michael E. Brown (1993)
explores the impact the resurgence in ethnic conflict has on both the regional and
international levels. He defines "ethnic conflict" as "a dispute about important political,
economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities"
(p. 5). These conflicts range from the non-violent (Czechoslovakia's "velvet divorce") to
"full scale military hostilities, and unspeakable levels of savagery, as seen in Angola,
Bosnia, the Caucasus" (p. 5).
9
Moscarelli cites Iran as the, classic example of an Islamic nation that has experienced both
"secular" and "revivalist" governments and the associated problems. Prior to 1979, the majority of Shi'ite
Muslims in Iran accepted "secular" institutions adopted by the Shah. "In 1979, the fundamentalist
revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini pushed the country hard in the direction of traditional thinking"
(Moscarelli, 1996, p. 36). Faced with the realities of growing population, high unemployment, and a large
debt from the war with Iraq, "forced the fundamentalist Iranian government to innovate and proclaim
certain traditionally frowned upon practices to be in accordance with Islamic law" (Moscarelli, 1996, p.
36).
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Since there have always been disputes between peoples of different
cultures, it becomes important to understand why some disagreements result in conflict.
Brown explores three levels of analysis in his explanation: systemic, domestic, and
perceptual. "Systemic explanations of ethnic conflict focus on the nature of the security
systems in which ethnic groups operate and the security concerns of these groups" (1993,
p. 6). Those who subscribe to the systemic explanation point to two necessary causes:
close proximity of two ethnic groups and "national, regional, and international
authorities...too weak to keep groups from fighting and too weak to ensure the security
of individual groups" (p. 6). Forced into providing for their own defense, ethnic groups
invariably end up contributing to the destabilization of the situation. "The problems
groups face is that, in taking steps to defend themselves-mobilizing armies and deploying
military forces-they often threaten the security of others" (p. 6).
Domestic explanations for ethnic conflict include: "the effectiveness of
states in addressing the concerns of their constituents, the impact of nationalism on inter-
ethnic relations, and the impact of democratization on inter-ethnic relations" (Brown,
1993, p. 8). Jack Snyder in his essay "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State"
posits that "people look to states to provide security and promote economic prosperity.
Nationalism, he maintains, reflects the need to establish states capable of achieving these
goals" (p. 8). "When state structures are weak, nationalism is likely to be based on ethnic
distinctions, rather that the idea that everyone who lives in a country is entitled to the
same rights and privileges" (p. 8). This leads to a sharpening of distinctions between
groups which can lead to persecution of minority groups and "...that ethnic minorities
will demand states of their own" (p. 9).
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The primary impact of democratization on ethnic conflict is "the tendency
in multiethnic societies for political parties to be organized along ethnic lines" (Brown,
1993, p. 10). When this occurs, especially in winner-take-all elections, minority groups
have little chance of ever gaining power. As such, they feel shut out, and are apt to push
for increased autonomy or outright independence.
Perceptual explanations for ethnic conflict center on "false-histories many
ethnic groups have of themselves and others" (Brown, 1993, p. 11). Stories passed from
generation to generation concerning the groups' origins and perceived wrongs committed
against it become fact. The group becomes convinced of the injustice of present situations
based upon previous events. Interestingly enough, the focus of the groups hate often
"mirror images" the original group. "Serbs for example see themselves as heroic
defenders of Europe and they see Croats as belligerent thugs; Croats see themselves as
valiant victims of oppression and Serbs as congenital aggressors" (p. 11).
The impact of ethnic conflict depends upon the outcome. Peaceful
reconciliation of ethnic groups through mediation poses few problems for the
international community. Ethnic separation on the other hand can include heavy regional
and international involvement through insertion of peacekeeping/peace enforcement
troops, questions of timing concerning recognition of "new states," and obligation of
"new states" to abide by treaties signed by the former state. By far, ethnic war can
potentially have the greatest impact on regional and international communities.
Brown (1993) describes seven ways in which ethnic wars can impact the
"outside world": civilian slaughter, refugees, WMD, chain reaction effects, neighboring
powers, distant interests, and international organizations. Civilian slaughter "poses a
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direct challenge to important international norms of behavior, the maintenance and
promotion of which is in the interest of the international community" (p. 17). Ethnic
conflict often generates great numbers of refugees since attacks on civilian populations
are a key tactic. The proliferation ofWMD increases the possibility of the use of them by
ethnic groups to achieve their aims. Chain reaction effects refer to the way in which
ethnic conflict can spread. "If a multiethnic state begins to fragment and allows some
ethnic groups to secede, other groups will inevitably press for more autonomy if not total
independence" (p. 19). Neighboring powers can be brought into internal ethnic conflict if
their "ethnic brethren" are being prosecuted in adjacent countries. For example, Serbian
persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo could lead to Albanian involvement. Distant
interests include both military interventions by outside states to secure the safety of its
citizens, and support of one side or the other in response to strategic goals. Ethnic conflict
can undermine the credibility of international organizations. Defiance of both regional
and international bodies can decrease their effectiveness in the current conflict and in
future conflict. "Just as effective intervention would bolster the credibility of
international action and possibly have a deterrent effect elsewhere, ineffective
intervention has a demonstration effect of its own" (p. 21).
b. Technology
Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishablefrom magic.
Arthur C. Clarke
Among other things, technology is the manner in which input is
transformed into output. Over the next ten years, the rate of technology change will
continue unabated. While this increasing rate of change will produce technologies that
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have yet to be imagined, it is "possible to predict trends in technological growth and
development that occur over shorter time spans (10-30 years)" (Parker. 1998). According
to Professor Patrick J. Parker (1998) of the Naval Postgraduate school, "90 percent of all
the scientists and engineers who have ever lived are alive today." Based on the
assumptions that the average productive lifetime of a scientist is 50 years, and that the
average span of a generation is 20 years, the result is that technical population growth is
exponential (1998). The implication, according to Professor Parker (1998), is that "the
total body of knowledge and technological capability will double every 20 years" and
that "half of all discoveries and inventions ever made were made in the last 20 years."
Computers, communications, sensors, precision navigation and positioning, stealth,
vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are
key technologies that will effect our vision of the future.
According to Moore's Law, "transistor density will double every 18
months" at the same cost (Parker, 1998). The implications of this are that computer
processing speeds and memory storage size will increase dramatically. Professor Parker
calculated that processing speeds will increase from 200 megahertz in 1995 to 60
gigahertz in 2020, and that memory size will increase from 32 megabytes in 1995 to 3.2
terabytes in 2020 on the average personal computer. From this Professor Parker (1998)
predicts that "the desktop PC of the year 2020 will have more power than the largest
supercomputer currently under development; yet will be no bigger nor more expensive
than a PC today." Increasing computer power will be an enabler of our key technologies.
Communications will change in three manners: modes, speed, and reach.
New means of communication will appear.* while current means including
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cellular/landline telephone, email/voicemail, Internet, radio, and personal pagers will be
improved. These modes of communication will allow for information to be collected,
transferred, and manipulated in a variety of ways, increasing redundancy, and resulting in
greater reliability. Coupled with increased computer power, communications
technologies will enable information to be tailored for presentation to specific audiences.
The amount of data and the speed at which it can be sent will increase. Infant
technologies like global cellular communications pioneered by the Iridium Corporation
and Global System Mobile (GSM) will mature. The cost of such technologies will
decrease, making them more accessible.
Sensor technology will also benefit from the increase in computing power.
Overhead, air-breathing and terrestrial-based sensors will be able to detect a larger
number of discrete target signatures. Reduced cost will allow for mass production of
sensors that work in a networked mode. Redundancy of networked sensors will improve
reliability and survivability. The result will be the ability to detect, identify, and geolocate
an increasing number of types of targets.
Precision navigation and positioning technologies such as the Global
Positioning System (GPS) will continue to mature. Redundancy, survivability, and
security of the system will increase. PNP technologies will allow exact geolocation that
will increase the accuracy of PGMs. Combined with improved sensors, PNP will
decrease friendly fire incidents through positive identification and geolocation.
Stealth, V/STOL, and UAV technologies will allow friendly forces to gain
access to non-permissive environments. Stealth will continue to defeat the majority of
peer competitor technologies designed to detect it. Those systems that can defeat stealth
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will remain few, and prohibitive in both cost and technical skill required to operate.
V/STOL platforms such as the CV-22 OSPREY will mature and be deployed in large
numbers. Usable payload, sensor type, datalink security, combat range, and survivability
will increase. Combinations of V/STOL, UAV, and stealth technology will further
increase access to denied areas without risking aircrew (a U.S. vulnerability).
c. Economics
In their book The Third-Wave, Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1980) posited the
idea of "transformatory changes in human history" which they labeled "waves."
According to their theory the "agricultural revolution of 10,000 years ago launched the
first-wave...; that the industrial revolution of 300 years ago triggered a second-wave of
change; and that we, today, are feeling the impact of a third-wave of change" (Toffler,
1993, p. 8). Each wave is distinguished by the dominant means of producing wealth and
its impact on all aspects of society, including government, family structure, the economy,
and warfare. In War and Anti-War, the Tofflers (1993) further assert that "the deepest
economic and strategic change of all is the coming division of the world into three
distinct, differing and potentially clashing civilizations" (p. 20).
Each change in "wave" is accompanied by massive conflict as the new
wealth producing paradigm clashes with the existing one. Stakeholders of the existing
wave resist the new wave because it threatens to make their wealth producing systems
"obsolete." Today, the changes brought about by the third-wave "threaten to slash many
of the existing economic links between the rich economies and the poor" (Toffler, 1993,
p. 25). Information will increasingly substitute for raw materials provided by first and
second-wave societies, decreasing third-wave societies dependence. The Tofflers (1993)
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predict that this "decoupling" will increase tensions between societies and may "provoke
some of the worst bloodshed in the years to come" (p. 27).
d. Politics
Transnational criminal organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and globally supported, populous based, networked, single-issue organizations will
increase in number and influence in the 21 st century. All three have the potential to
undermine the authority of traditional states, and may have their greatest impact in those
societies experiencing social disorder preventing formation of a viable state government.
TCOs and NGOs in particular have the potential to usurp the authority of fledgling
governments by operating with impunity, demonstrating their extra-legal status. They
may also appropriate the authority of the state by supplanting its monopoly on
distribution of goods and services. The ability to reward and punish a regional populace
may provide the TCO an area of influence/sanctuary.
As chairman for the Global Organized Crime Project, former Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, R. James Woosley (1998), described the gamut of
activities and the impact TCOs have on governments:
While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, some
governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy
interests imperiled abroad. Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers
and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank
fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft and sale of
nuclear material, political intimidation, and corruption all constitute a
poisonous brew—a mixture potentially as deadly as what we faced during
the cold war.
Globally supported, populous based, networked, single-issue organizations
and limited agenda NGOs like those who have championed the comprehensive land mine
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ban will spread. Through leveraging of global communications it becomes possible to
mobilize individuals around the world. These organizations may in and of themselves
become a weapon of asymmetric warfare by targeting a nation's "will to resist." For
example, the comprehensive landmine ban drive could be interpreted as an attempt to
eliminate the military advantages enjoyed by those actors employing them.
e. Environment
Natural resources have always been a source of conflict. "The
archaeological record has described disputes over water resources when 5,000 years ago,
the Tigris River and Euphrates River valley was used both as a reason for conflict and as
a weapon" (Savana, 1996, p. 184). Obtaining adequate amounts of natural resources to
maintain, let alone progress from one wave to another, will be a source of conflict in the
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st
century. Potable water, arable land, and oil all show signs of reaching their maximum
utility according to the 1980 Global 2000 Report to the President (p. 184).
Fresh water is a prerequisite for life. It is used for agricultural, domestic,
and industrial purposes. Only 3 percent of the earth's water is fresh water. "To put fresh
water in perspective, consider this: if the world's total water supply were only 1000 liters,
the usable supply of fresh water would be only 0.003 liter, or one-half teaspoon" (Kinner,
1996, p. 164). Precipitation, rate of use, and quality of available water affect the amount
available for man's use. The rate of use and quality of available water among second and
third-wave societies is far greater than first-wave societies. First-wave societies tend to
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use greater amounts on agriculture than second and third-waves. 10 Third-wave societies
use greater amounts on industrial endeavors. ' ' Increasing populations in first and second-
wave societies will necessitate using greater amounts for agriculture, limiting their ability
to progress to the next wave, which may produce inter-wave conflict.
Oil will remain the primary energy source for the 21st century. Religious
fundamentalism and ethnic-conflict may impact the ability to access both Middle East oil
fields and Caspian Sea deposits. Whichever region is best able to manage these driving
forces will dominate the supply of petroleum products. Second and third-wave societies
will have to take into account these forces as they develop strategies to access the
regions.
In his article "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence
from Cases," Thomas F. Homer-Dixon ( 1 994) concludes that
...environmental scarcity causes violent conflict. This conflict tends to be
persistent, diffuse, and sub-national. Its frequency will probably jump
sharply in the next decades as scarcities rapidly worsen in many parts of
the world. Of immediate concern are scarcities of cropland, water, forests,
and fish, whereas atmospheric changes such as global warming will
probably not have a major effect for several decades, and then mainly by




Approximately 67 percent of the world's water supply is used to support agricultural
production. Agriculture uses 82 percent of the available water in Asia, 40 percent in the United States, and
30 percent in Europe. In Egypt, more than 98 percent of all water used is for crop production while China
and India use approximately 90 percent of their water supply to support agriculture (Kinner, 1996, p. 164).
" The amount of water used for industrial applications varies according to each nation's level of
technological development. In Canada, industry accounts for 84 percent of all water used: in India, it takes
a mere 1 percent (Kinner, 1996, p. 165).
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Countries experiencing chronic internal conflict because of environmental
stress will probably either fragment or become more authoritarian.
Fragmenting countries will be the source of large out-migrations, and they
will be unable to effectively negotiate to implement international
agreements on security, trade and environmental protection. Authoritarian
regimes may be inclined to launch attacks against other countries to divert
popular attention from internal stresses. Any of these outcomes could
seriously disrupt international security. The social impacts of
environmental scarcity therefore deserve concerted attention from security
scholars.
2. Predetermined Elements Affecting the Operating Environment in the Year
2010
Schwartz (1991) identifies four strategies for looking for predetermined elements:
in the pipeline today, slow-changing phenomena, constrained situations, inevitable collisions
(pp. 111-112). In the pipeline today refers to those events or trends that have begun and
will continue along a given path unless interrupted. Schwartz includes population growth,
with associated demographics, as the prime example. While not bound by a specific time
period, slow changing phenomena are those events that can be considered relatively
constant for the period of your scenario. Schwartz includes in this category things such as
growth of populations, the building of physical infrastructure, and development of
resources (p. 111). Constrained situations are those that limit freedom of choice.
Constrained situations allow for only a limited number of options that meet your
requirements. Inevitable collisions are produced from irreconcilable positions. The
demand for increased services while refusing to pay higher taxes produces an inevitable





•S Permanent migration & temporary
refugees
s Disproportionate birthrates (higher in
first/second-wave societies)
s Population concentration (urban vs.
rural)
s Age demographics ("graying" of third-
wave societies)
S Primacy of Nation-states
•s Ascendance of information warfare






s U. S. defense budget
s Size of the U. S. Armed Forces
s Weapons systems
S Clash of Civilizations
s Ethno-nationalism
Table 2.2: Predetermined Elements Affecting the Operating Environment in the
Year 2010
a. In the Pipeline: Population
In 1900, 1.7 billion people populated the earth. Today the number stands
at approximately 6 billion, and continues to increase annually by 80 million, or one
billion every 12-15 years (Zwingle, 1998, p. 38). "The United Nations estimates that by
the year 2050 there could be from 7.7 billion to 1 1.2 billion in the world" (p. 38). Mass
migration, internal and external refugees, regional birth rates disproportionate to the
ability to support them, and demographics (including age composition and concentration)
are just some of the problems that may produce conflict in the 21 st century. In the short
term, these problems will remain relatively constant.
Migration is the permanent relocation of people and is driven by the "pull"
of better living conditions (good wages, freedom, land, or peace) in other locations, and
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the "push" of worse conditions (low incomes, repression, overcrowding or war) at home
(Parfit, 1998, p. 16). Defined as "forced migration," disease, famine, and war drive great
numbers annually to other countries permanently. Refugees are those persons displaced
on a temporary basis, which in reality can stretch into years. Internal refugees are
displaced persons within their country of origin; external refugees are displaced persons
who have left their country of origin. In 1 997, the United Nations High Commission on
Refugees provided aid to over 22 million persons displaced by conflict (p. 16).
Either permanent or temporary movements of large numbers of persons
can create hardships that strain the international system. Government and natural
resources can be overwhelmed. External refugees may bring ideas and customs that are in
conflict with the host nation. Refugees can be brought into direct competition with the
host nations population for everything from jobs, to homes, to food, to government
assistance, creating a backlash of xenophobia.
"98 percent of population growth is in the developing world" where a
variety of factors conspire to keep birthrates high, while limiting the region's ability to
support them (Zwingle, 1998, p. 38). Poor medical care, lack of education, religious and
societal norms, and political and economic instability are just some of the causes of
disproportionately high birthrates. Lack of access to proper medical care drives women to
have many children to ensure some reach adulthood. Economic instability forces parents
to have large families as part of the traditional "social security" for old age. Religious and
societal norms tend to disprove of contraceptive, the most straightforward and effective
means of bringing down birthrates (p. 43). Disproportionately high birthrates mean that
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first and second-wave societies will increasingly become "younger," while established
third-wave societies will become "older."
b. Slow Changing Phenomena
While we have raised the possibility of the increasing impact ofNGOs and
TCOs, nation-states will maintain their preeminent position in world-politics. They will
continue to speak for the majority of mankind and will be the primary actors impacting
our envisioned future.
Conventional, second-wave warfare will decrease in importance as the
power of IW is effectively demonstrated. Third-wave societies will transition their forces
to reflect their adoption of the "information age." First and second-wave societies will
field a mix of forces and strategies reflective of their "wave progression," while
incorporating aspects of available third-wave technology.
c. Constrained Situations
In spite of recent modest increases to the U.S. defense budget, it is still
arguable that the requirement for military forces exceeds what available resources can
provide. Dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 convinced' many of an impending
"peace dividend" which would allow massive downsizing of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Repeated cuts have reduced the size of the force almost 40 percent. These cuts have
occurred as operational deployments have increased.
d. Inevitable Collisions: Societal
Samuel P. Huntington (1996) suggests in his book, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, that conflict generated by many of the
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aforementioned driving forces and predetermined elements will occur along the lines of
civilizations. Civilizations, "defined by both common objective elements, such as
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification
of people" divide the world into eight sects: Western, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Japanese,
Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African (pp. 43-45).
3. Critical Uncertainties Affecting the Operating Environment in the Year
2010
Critical uncertainties attempt to capture those forces that could radically alter your
scenario. In our scenario, the type of adversary we face is of critical importance. Our
vision of the future is based upon the hypothesis that the U.S. will face primarily niche
competitors who will utilize asymmetric warfare to avoid our traditional strengths
(conventional, second-wave forces). If our hypothesis is incorrect, how viable is our
SOFIA doctrine? Is it robust enough to handle peer competitors? Our second major
critical uncertainty is the use of WMD. A variety of factors contribute to proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. Will increased availability lead to
increased use? Today, we have no viable defense against the most common envisioned
means for employing these weapons. Will niche competitors see WMD as an asymmetric
approach to combating U.S. forces? (See Table 2.3 for summation of critical
uncertainties).
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POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
s Predominance of Niche or Peer S Will increased availability lead to
Competitors? increased use?
s Which will pose the greater threat to the s Will Niche competitors see WMD as an
U.S.? equalizer?
S Will the threat of WMD limit the U. S.
'
ability to employ SOFIA forces?
Table 2.3: Critical Uncertainties Affecting the Operating Environment in the Year
2010
a. Potential Adversaries: Niche or Peer Competitor?
Peer competitors are those entities that are comparable in size,
organization, economic stature, and military capability to the U.S. They will tend to
"mirror image" our strategies in the political, economic and military arenas. They will
require many of the same resources as the U.S. They will have similar national goals and
a need to maintain regional areas of influence. Most third-wave societies, and many
second-wave societies will fall into this category. Conversely, niche competitors are
those organizations that challenge the U.S. in only limited categories. They will tend to
be smaller in size, with a pronounced reliance upon dissimilar strategies. They will have
more limited goals and may look entirely different in organization from the U.S. They
may be either small state or non-state actors. Non-state niche competitors may have little
need to control territory or population. Non-state actors may readily concede a lack of
territorial integrity or total control over their populace. Many first-wave, and some
second-wave societies will fall into this category. Non-state actors such as terrorists,
transnational criminals, and NGOs will predominate.
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b. WMDs: Increased use?
WMD are those weapons that can create widespread destruction in far
greater proportion to their size or cost. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are
historically included in this group. IW may soon be included in this category due to
theoretical large-scale secondary effects. For example, an IW attack that disables the
System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system of a large oil refinery could
produce the same results as a limited NBC strike. In the twentieth century, states have
held a monopoly on the production and use of WMD. This has been due primarily to the
technical skill required, the rarity of component materials, and the costs associated with
the production of them. A variety of factors have led to the lowering of these barriers
over the past decade.
"The so-called 'brain drain'—an exodus of scientists, technicians, and
engineers out of former Soviet scientific communities—began in the late 1 980s, when the
Soviet Union was in the throes of dynamic social and economic change" 12 (Moody,'
1996). The concern has been that "idle and unemployed personnel from the Soviet
Union's sprawling nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction
complexes might sell their know-how or emigrate to countries of proliferation concern"
(1996). Countries with previous relationships with the USSR in respect to WMD
technologies are primary customers, and include North Korea, Libya, Iran, and China
(1996).
12
For example, by 1994 the Russian Scientific Center for Virology and Biotechnology that
specializes in biological warfare agent R&D, had lost about 3,500 personnel. Between 1991 and 1996, the
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Pfiysics, which specializes in nuclear warhead
R&D, lost about 5,000 personnel (Moody, 1996).
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Materials required to assemble NBC weapons have become easier to
acquire. Many of the technologies integral to WMD production are dual use, frustrating
attempts to slow proliferation. Biological and chemical weapons can be produced with
the same types of systems used to manufacture pesticides and pharmaceuticals, or brew
beer. Weapons grade nuclear material is the primary stumbling block to production of
nuclear weapons, but acquisition of it has become easier with the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. "In 1995, Russian law enforcement authorities acknowledged cracking 21
cases of theft of fissile material since mid- 1992, some of it enriched, and prosecuting 19
Russian citizens" (Webster, 1996). "The chilling reality. ..is that nuclear materials and
technologies are more accessible now than at any time in history", according to former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. John Deutch (1996). IW means of
conducting WMD attacks have even lower entry costs. The cost of developing and
employing computer viruses, Trojan horses, and logic bombs is limited to a good
computer, a skilled computer operator, and access. Bulgaria, the "Silicon Valley" of
Eastern Europe, has experienced many of the same troubles as Russia. Large numbers of
trained software engineers, computer scientists, and skilled computer operators have
emigrated or contracted out their services to third parties.
B. OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 2010
Based upon our driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties
we envision a future framed by clashing "waves" and "civilizations." Religious
fundamentalism and ethnic conflict will be the visible symptoms of this conflict as they
simultaneously resist third-wave society, and strive to achieve the trappings of second-
wave society (Tofflers, 1993). Population increases in first and second-wave societies
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will exacerbate the competition for decreasing natural resources. NGOs and TCOs will
increase in number and will have a greater impact on world politics, but will not supplant
the nation-state as the primary actor. The rate of technological change will increase
,
exponentially further widening the gap between the waves. The collection, processing,
presentation, and dissemination of information will become a key aspect of warfare.
Potential adversaries of the U.S. will most likely be niche competitors from either first or
second-wave societies, but does not exclude third-wave niche competitors. Proliferation
of WMD will increase due to lower barriers to entry. Holding U.S. infrastructure at risk
with WMD may come to be seen as the "ultimate" asymmetric approach for our
opponents. Peer competitors will be few. Niche competitors will predominate.
C. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify those driving factors,
predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties, which may shape the future operating
environment. Thinking through the scenario's suggested by these factors will allow force
planners to develop an appropriately structured . armed force to face the United States
most probable adversaries. It is our contention that our SOFIA doctrine will be a natural
choice for combating those opponents.
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III. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
"Countries which are not proficient in conventional warfare are not likely to make
excellent strategic use even oftactically successful special operations.
"
Colin Gray
Special operations forces, by definition, are inherently different from general
purpose forces (GPF). They possess unique characteristics that allow them to accomplish
missions that conventional forces are unable to perform effectively and efficiently. A
popular misconception of special operations is that they are a phenomenon of the mid-to-
late twentieth century (Cohen, 1978). In actuality there are many examples throughout
the history of warfare that meet the standards set by today's definitions; Rogers' Rangers
daring raid on St. Francis during the Seven Years War (Arquilla, 1996, p. 56), T.E.
Lawrence's attacks upon the bridges supplying the Turkish Army in Palestine during
World War One (p. 182), and Marion's Guerrillas during the American Revolutionary
War with England. These examples provide a wealth of information from which basic
truths of special operations can be drawn. Key among these is the ability of small forces
to achieve victory over larger forces. While conventional forces rely upon destruction of
the enemy, SOF focus mainly on rendering the enemy ineffective. This is accomplished
by employing SOF in such a manner as to avoid an adversary's strength, or by
neutralizing a key component of the opponent's command and control (C2).
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) currently
embraces nine principal SOF missions and activities. These include: counterproliferation
(CP), combating terrorism (CBT), foreign internal defense (FID), special reconnaissance
(SR), direct action (DA), psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil affairs (CA),
unconventional warfare (UW), and information operations (10) (U.S. Special Operations
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Forces Posture Statement, 1998, p. 3). The attributes that allow U.S. SOF to conduct
these missions may allow them to execute operations, currently the domain of
conventional forces, when faced with a future similar to the one envisioned in Chapter II.
In this chapter we will review commonly accepted definitions of key terms and
concepts associated with SOF. This will allow the reader who is not familiar with SOF to
better understand the discipline. Next we will conduct a SWOT analysis of SOF to
determine its utility as a distinct discipline. Following chapters on IO and AP will be
structured in the same manner.
A. DEFINITIONS
Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations defines special
operations as "operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped
military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational
objectives by unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas" (JP
3-05, 1998, p. 1-1). USSOCOM has developed five requirements that distinguish special
operations from conventional military operations: 1. Unconventional training and
equipment; 2. Political sensitivity; 3. Unorthodox approaches; 4. Limited opportunity;
and 5. Specialized intelligence (SOF Posture Statement, 1998, p. 1). The SOF Posture
Statement (1998) lists six characteristics of SOF that allows them to conduct special
operations: 1. Mature professionals with leadership abilities; 2. Specialized skills,
equipment, and tactics; 3. Regional focus; 4. Language skills; 5. Political, and cultural
sensitivity; and 6. Small, flexible, joint structure.
While the boundaries and descriptors developed and set forth by USSOCOM are
useful in defining U.S. SOF, Colin Gray (1996) suggests that "in order to secure a
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sufficiently holistic understanding of special operations, it is useful to think of them in
terms of three things: a state of mind; forces; and a mission" (p. 56). It is the "state of
mind" that really defines special operations. Without the freedom accorded special
operators to conceive of operations in unorthodox and innovate ways, special operations
run the risk of being "reduced to a narrow, tightly defined set of missions that special
operations forces already have trained to perform or to merely what bureaucratic
definition and assignments formally allow" (p. 156). Once limited, special operations lose
their greatest utility, their ability to address situations outside the capabilities of
conventional forces.
B. CONCEPTS
1. The Theory of Special Operations
In his book Spec Ops, William McRaven (1995) develops a theory of special
operations based upon a concept he calls "relative superiority." He defines it as "a
condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive
advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy" (p. 4). Through case study he
developed three basic properties of relative superiority. First, "relative superiority is
achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement" (p. 4). Secondly, "once relative
superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee victory" (p. 5). Finally,
"if relative superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain" (p. 6).
While sufficient to explain the success or failure of SOF conducting short
duration direct action missions, relative superiority may not be applicable to the wide
range of missions subsumed beneath the term MOOTW (missions other than war). The
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Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia defines MOOTW as "operations that encompass the use of
military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war" (p. 512).
Representative examples of MOOTW missions include peace enforcement,
counterterrorism, peacekeeping, NEO, nation assistance, counterinsurgency, counterdrug,
and humanitarian assistance (Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, 1997, p. 513). Many of these
activities are missions that USSOCOM currently list as "collateral activities." 13 In
Chapter II, we envisioned a future dominated by these types of missions. It is in these
areas that we believe our SOFIA doctrine may be especially applicable. In Chapter VI we
expand the concept of relative superiority to encompass these actions.
2. Integration of SOF and GPF
Integration of SOF and GPF involves coordinating the efforts of both forces to
achieve a common goal, and leveraging the effects of one force for the benefit of the
other. Integration allows each force to support the other by providing capabilities and
resources the other does not have. For instance, SOF lacks the ability to move its forces
worldwide. Conventional forces, in the form of strategic airlift, can provide this
capability. Integration also prevents SOF and GPF from inadvertently working against
the other. It prevents wasting resources through servicing a target twice. It prevents one
force from destroying a target that is being exploited by the other. Integration of SOF and
GPF is normally reflected in the designation of one as the "supported" or "supporting"
command.
1j
Current USSOCOM collateral activities include coalition support, combat search and rescue
(CSAR), counterdrug (CD), humanitarian demining (HD) activities, humanitarian assistance (HA), peace
operations, security assistance, and special activities (SOF Posture Statement, 1998, p. 4).
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3. "Supported" vs. "Supporting"
Operational control of SOF may be exercised by a variety of commanders at all
levels within a joint force. Normally the theater special operations command (SOC)
exercises C2 of SOF in support of the regional Commander-in-Chiefs (CINC) objectives
(JP 3-05, pp. 34-41). When integrated with conventional forces, SOF is routinely
subordinated (designated the "supporting command") to the GPF commander (the
"supported command"). This is appropriate when facing peer and niche competitors
engaging in second-wave conventional warfare. The danger is that this relationship may
always be assumed by decision-makers as optimal, regardless of the opponent faced.
When facing niche competitors utilizing first and third-wave technologies, SOF may be
better suited for designation as the "supported command."
C. SWOT ANALYSIS
Analyzing the internal strengths and weaknesses, and external opportunities and
threats of SOF, allows us to determine its utility as a separate discipline. Strengths and
weaknesses are those characteristics of SOF that establish inherent limits of the
discipline. Opportunities and threats are factors in the environment that may increase the
effectiveness of SOF, or limit its effective application.
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STRENGTH WEAKNESS
•S Quality of personnel
•/ Sponsorship
s High state of readiness
S Small size
s Ability to task organize elements
S Variable lethality
s Variable profile (high, medium, low)
S High tooth-to-tail ratio
s Small "footprint"
/ Economy of force
S Multilingual, culturally and politically
sensitive
S Small in number
S Limited organic combat power
S Long lead time for training competent
SOF
S Service training requirements at odds
with Joint training
s Requires detailed intelligence often
obtainable only through HUMINT
•s Limited endurance in operations due




s Opportunity for over-control or misuse
by commanders/national decision-
makers
s Need for secrecy impacts proper
coordination
s "Free Lunch" syndrome
S Inadequate C2
S Inadequate intelligence support
s Increasing mission area applicability
S IO/IW
s Technology
Table 3.1: SWOT Analysis of U.S. SOF
1. Strengths and Weaknesses of U.S. SOF
The primary strength of U.S. SOF is the quality of people who make up the
organization. Individual services conduct highly competitive selection processes to
ensure that only the best are accepted. Physical and mental requirements have been
developed that ensure that those who pass will best be able to function in the fast-paced,
dynamic environment of special operations. Sponsorship by high-level decision-makers
ensures visibility and access to required resources.
The small size of SOF units makes them easier to maintain in a high state of
readiness and to transport quickly by air. The ability to task organize elements allows
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SOF to put "the right folks on the right job." Smaller forces mean a smaller footprint,
logistics trail, and greater operational security, all of which contribute to the ability of
SOF to conduct operations with a variable profile.
Regional indoctrination in the form of language training, culture familiarization,
and development of political savvy, allows SOF to interact successfully with foreign
military and civilian personnel. Understanding the local culture and language implies a
genuine interest in the affairs of the people SOF are engaging which may increase
effectiveness during humanitarian or peace operations. Political savvy ensures that SOF
personnel are aware of the possible implications of their actions on the domestic,
regional, and international stages.
Paradoxically, the same attribute that provides SOF many of its strengths (small
size), also contributes to the primary weakness of SOF. Being small in size reduces the
organic combat power of most SOF units. SOF ground forces must rely upon the
resources they carry on their back. This limits the number and types of weapons they may
use in an operation. Limited organic combat power reduces SOF effectiveness when
facing a larger force. When involved in DA missions, SOF relies upon the concept of
"relative superiority." Once lost, it becomes extremely difficult to regain due to the
disparity in sizes between units.
The long lead-time required to produce competent special operators is an inherent
weakness of SOF. The American political system and culture do not lend themselves well
to long-term strategic planning. This is a required skill when attempting to develop forces
to meet future requirements. If you misjudge the future and produce the wrong type or an
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insufficient number of forces, it will be impossible to quickly produce competent SOF to
fill the gap.
The tension between service and joint training requirements can impair the ability
of SOF to achieve a high state of readiness. Joint training requires different service
elements to allocate time to operations that exercise the application of the individual
services skills- in support of a common goal. The more "specialized" the skill of the
service element, the more individual training they will require to achieve and maintain
proficiency prior to conducting joint training. For instance, SOF aircrews have quarterly,
semi-annual, and annual training requirements that must be met to achieve and maintain
proficiency in their weapon system. There are a limited number of aircraft, and their
flight time must be divided between real-world operations, training, and exercises. Each
fraction can only be increased by decreasing one of the others. Therefore, the more joint
training that is mandated, the less time available to conduct service specific training.
Without the service specific training, the service element may not be able to perform its
specialized role in support of the joint mission.
Special operations often require extremely detailed intelligence obtainable only
through human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. Others require knowing the intentions of
adversaries, which may be difficult to discern when facing opponents utilizing first-wave
technologies. When involved in DA missions, it may crucial to know information such as
which way a door opens, or how a first-wave opponent is executing C2 of his forces. U.S.
intelligence collection systems are optimized for collection against second and third-wave
information systems. It may be impossible to provide the granularity of information
required by SOF to conduct some of its operations.
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2. Opportunities for, and Threats to, U.S. SOF
In Chapter II, we developed a future scenario heavily influenced by Samuel
Huntington's (1996) "clash of civilizations" and the Toffler's (1980) "wave theory." Both
hypothesize that future conflicts will occur primarily between societies of different wave
progression, and different civilizations. Based on this future, the U.S. will likely face a
multitude of niche competitors (primarily first and third-wave societies) and few peer
competitors (primarily second and third-wave societies). As suggested by Huntington, we
believe that the majority of these conflicts will occur at the "fault lines" between
civilizations. Marked by ethnic strife, religious fundamentalism, and resource disputes,
most will take the form of lower intensity conflicts. U.S. involvement could include
peace operations, humanitarian assistance, demining activities, or "policing" activities.
SOF have the characteristics and skills required to successfully operate in these
environments.
The greatest threat facing SOF is that of "conventionalization."
Conventionalization is a process by which special operations forces take on the
characteristics, roles, and missions of conventional forces (Cohen, 1978). The larger SOF
becomes, the more formalized its roles and missions become, and the more narrowly
defined the scope of operations that it can perform. Once this happens, SOF loses its
greatest utility, its ability to creatively address situations that have never before occurred.
High visibility, the vested interest of sponsors and advocates, and a relatively low
cost-to-gain ratio (free lunch syndrome) invites both misuse and overuse of SOF by
national decision-makers. The wide range of capabilities of U.S. SOF makes them a
choice of first resort for many decision-makers. Unfortunately, this preoccupation with
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the benefits of using SOF can lead to high operational tempos (OPSTEMPO) and
personnel tempos (PERSTEMPO). High OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO can negatively
impact morale, retention, and training, reducing combat effectiveness of SOF.
D. UTILITY OF U.S. SOF
Utility refers to the types of tasks that a discipline can perform and how well it
can accomplish them. Colin Gray (1996) uses four questions to determine a discipline's
utility.
WHAT UNIQUELY, CAN THE DISCIPLINE DO?
s Provide physical access to remote or denied areas, in low-medium threat
environments
S Successfully engage foreign military and civilian personnel
S Provide interface between coalition warfare partners
s Act decisively as the "supported" force in first-wave warfare
WHAT CAN THE DISCIPLINE DO WELL?
s Achieve "desired effects" in greater proportion to resources expended
s Mobilize and deploy quickly
s Conduct operations at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of war
S Conduct covert or clandestine operations
S Act successfully as either the "supported/supporting" force in second, and third-
wave warfare
WHAT DOES THE DISCIPLINE DO POORLY?
V_ Provide the effects of "physical presence" over a wide geographic area
WHAT IS THE DISCIPLINE UNABLE TO DO?
S Occupy and hold territory for long period of time
s Engage larger forces in sustained combat
Table 3.2: Utility of U.S. SOF
1. What Uniquely, Can the Discipline Do?
SOF has four primary utilities: 1. Provide access; 2. Engage foreign military and
civilian personnel; 3. Provide interface between coalition warfare partners; and 4. Act
decisively as the "supported" force when facing first-wave opponents.
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SOF ability to provide access to remote or denied areas is based upon the
technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed by the different
service elements. SOF aircraft, surface vessels, and submarines employ a combination of
,
PNP, terrain avoidance/terrain following (TA/TF) radars, low observable technologies,
and offensive/defensive electronic warfare suites designed to allow them to avoid, and if
need be, defeat enemy defenses. SOF personnel employ special TTP such as terrain
masking, and high altitude, low opening/high altitude, high opening (HALO/HAHO)
airborne insertion.
Foreign language skills and cultural/political sensitivities of U.S. SOF make them
optimal for interfacing with both foreign military and civilian personnel. During
DESERT STORM, SOF performed as coalition support teams (CSTs), providing
translation services and "ground truth" to U.S. commanders. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, U.S.
SOF formed joint commission observer (JCO) teams to interact with civilian Bosnian
authorities and to provide "ground truth" to U.S./NATO commanders.
When confronting adversaries employing first-wave technologies, SOF is best
able to act as the lead component for U.S. forces. U.S. conventional forces are optimized
for fighting peer competitors employing second-wave technologies. It many instances,
the U.S. will be unable to bring to bear its technologically superior forces against niche
competitors employing first-wave technologies. The cultural and political sensitivities of
SOF will allow them to better understand this type of low intensity conflict.
2. What Can the Discipline Do Well?
Colin Gray (1996) develops a list of nine broad categories of strategic utility of
special operations grouped into two general categories in his book Explorations in
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Strategy. Master claims include "economy of force" and "expansion of choice." Economy
of force refers to the fact that SOF "can achieve significant results with limited forces"
(p. 168). Expansion of choice refers to the fact that "special operations can expand the
options available to political and military leaders" (p. 174). SOF provide political leaders
with a low cost (in terms of commitment and number of potential friendly casualties)
alternative to achieve political and military objectives. SOF can be used as a force
multiplier supporting conventional forces during larger scale conflicts, or as the
supported force during low-to-medium intensity conflicts against first and third-wave
niche competitors.
3. What Does the Discipline Do Poorly?
SOF, by themselves, are unable to provide the effects of physical presence over a
large geographic area due to the small number and size of their units. Physical presence
provides a visible symbol of commitment. There are few, if any, substitutions for
physical presence. However, SOF, enhanced with information superiority and battlespace
mobility, will be able to extend the effects of their physical presence over a much larger
area.
4. What Is the Discipline Unable To Do?
SOF are unable to engage larger forces in sustained combat, or to hold territory
when threatened with larger forces. The small size and number of SOF units limits their
organic combat power. Without augmentation from conventional forces, such as on call
AP, they will be unable to sustain any initial relative superiority.
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E. CONCLUSION
Our analysis of SOF revealed that their primary utility is their ability to engage
niche competitors effectively, from first and third-wave societies. SOF strengths
(including quality of personnel, regional orientation through language, cultural, and
political training, small size, variable lethality, and variable profile) provide them with




Dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as
occupying the land or controlling the air has been in the past.
General Ronald R. Fogelman, USAF
In accordance with our methodology, this chapter will begin with a review of key
terms and concepts that are integral to the understanding of 10. From there we will
conduct a SWOT analysis that will yield the utility of 10 in relation to our envisioned
future.
A. DEFINITIONS
A variety of definitions that range from the narrow to the all encompassing have
been put forth purporting to define information operations. A definition of IO developed
by the U.S. Air Force encompasses the majority of the concepts and ideas held by the
authors.
Information operations comprise those actions taken to gain, exploit,
defend, or attack information and information systems and include both
information-in-warfare and information warfare and are conducted
throughout all phases of an operation across the range of military
operations (AFDD 2-5, 1998, p. 2).
While broad, the USAF definition does clearly convey the key idea of the
pervasive nature of 10. It is more a unifying concept than an individual discipline. It cuts
across functional and administrative boundaries and binds traditional disciplines together.
It is not restricted to a particular phase of a campaign or level of warfare. 10 may have
tactical, operational, and strategic effects. It may be approached from either a technical or
psychological angle. It is as much about recognizing your own vulnerabilities as it is
targeting your adversaries. With these ideas in mind, it is important to understand two
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"conceptually distinct, but extremely interrelated pillars" of 10: IW and informalion-in-
warfare. (AFDD 2-5, 1998, p. 3)
Information-in-warfare "involves the Air Force's extensive capabilities to provide
global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on its integrated
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information collection and
dissemination activities; and its global navigation and positioning, weather, and
communications capabilities" (AFDD 2-5, 1998, p. 2.). IW is "information operations
conducted to defend the Air Force's own information and information systems or
conducted to attack and affect an adversary's information and information systems"
(AFDD 2-5, 1998, p. 2).
Martin Libicki (1995) in his book What Is Information Warfare? avoids directly
defining IW but instead categorizes the various activities that have come to be associated
with IW. C2W is "the military strategy that implements Information Warfare on the
battlefield and integrates physical destruction. Its objective is to decapitate the enemy's
command structure from its body of command forces" (p. 9). C2W includes operations
security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical
destruction. "IBW occurs when intelligence is fed directly into operations (notably,
targeting and battle damage assessment), rather than used as an input for overall
command and control" (p. 19). Electronic warfare focuses on "radioelectronic and
cryptographic, thus war in the realm of communications. EW attempts to degrade the
physical basis for transferring information, while cryptographic warfare works between
bits and bytes" (p. 27).
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Psychological operations encompasses "the use of information against the human
mind... there are four categories of PSYOPS: 1. operations against the national will; 2.
operations against opposing commanders; 3. operations against troops; and 4. cultural
conflict" (p. 35). Hacker warfare is attacks against civilian computer resources with the
intent of an attack ranging from "total paralysis to intermittent shutdown, random data
errors, wholesale theft of information, theft of services, illicit system's monitoring, the
injection of false message traffic, and access to data for the purpose of blackmail. Among
the popular devices are viruses, logic bombs, Trojan horses, and sniffers" (pp. 49-50).
EIW deals with denying an adversary access to information that "would cripple the
economies of those nations, bringing them to their knees" (p. 67). Cyberwarfare is by far
the most futuristic/conceptual of Libicki's categories and includes information terrorism,
semantic attacks, simula-warfare and Gibson-warfare. Semantic attacks are conducted
such that "a system under attack operates and will be perceived as operating correctly,
but will generate answers at variance with reality" (p. 77). Simula-warfare posits that
computer simulations of warfare may eventually be good enough, that they can be used to
convince an adversary that they would lose an actual battle. Gibson-warfare deals with
virtual warfare conducted by virtual characters within cyberspace, but is not seen as
relevant to national security at this time (p. 82).
B. CONCEPTS
1. IO Process Ownership
An enduring point of contention associated with IO is the concept of "ownership."
Where you stand on ownership, depends on your definition of IO and where you report.
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If you subscribe to a narrow definition similar to traditional C2W (military deception,
operational security, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical destruction),
you are more likely to perceive 10 as a discrete discipline to be controlled by a single
organization. If you support an expanded view of 10, similar to the USAF definition, it is
easier to embrace the idea of shared ownership. Both positions have merit, but by
adopting Libicki's categories, we are able to begin to progress beyond the
conceptual/theoretical, to the concrete. These categories allow us to assign responsibility
to organizations for development of applications. For example, C2W is primarily the
concern of the Department of Defense, and specifically the Joint C2W Center (JC2WC)
at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, while the Departments of Commerce and State may best
foster EIW strategies.
2. Paradox of the "Late Modernizer"
The traditional interpretation of the concept of the "late modernizer" is that by
delaying your adoption of a new technology, you can reap the benefits of others research
and development (R&D) costs (Gerschenkron, 1962). You can avoid the mistakes others
have made, spend your R&D dollars in those areas which were most promising, or even
adopt others R&D results wholesale. The paradox of the "late modernizer" in relation to
10 is that the benefit may actually go to the group that pioneers a technology.
By "owning" the initial technology, it is possible that others will become
dependent upon your organization for it. For example, Intel produces the Pentium II
microprocessor chip for a large percentage of personal computers. Microsoft provides
software for an even greater percentage of systems. As dependence increases, it becomes
possible for the supplying organization to provide "chipped" products to consumers.
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Chipped products may be hardware or software that has been modified in some manner.
The modification may allow the originator unauthorized access at a later date (a
backdoor), or include a logic bomb that destroys system data at a key moment.
3. IW, A Wasting Asset?
A wasting asset is a concept or technology application that becomes less potent
with every use. For example, initial uses of "Q-Ships" by the British during World War
One were quite successful. Q-Ships were highly modified sailing ships stuffed with
lumber for added buoyancy and outfitted with guns (Thomas, 1924). Appearing to be
defenseless cargo ships, they would lure German U-boats into attacking them. Since the
Q-Ships appeared defenseless, the U-boats would normally approach on the surface and
provide a warning to their intended target. When in range, the Q-Ships would run up the
white war ensign, slide the movable gun platform into the open, and commence firing
(1924). Q-Ship successes declined rapidly as the Germans realized what was happening,
and altered their tactics.
The concept of the "wasting asset" may be especially applicable to IW. For
instance, Libicki's hackerwarfare approaches may only be successful once. Breaching an
adversary's computer security systems alerts them to their vulnerability. It may cause
them to radically improve their defenses, or even go "off-line", removing themselves
from public internets. The result, no more access to their systems. This must be taken into
account when deciding when to use IW.
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4. The Unintended Consequences ofIW Attacks
While intended to lead to the destruction of their adversaries' U-boat fleet, British
Q-Ships may instead have lead to the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare by the
Germans. Following several run-ins with Q-Ships, the Kaiser's fleet discontinued
providing warnings to intended targets for fear of being attacked by apparently
"defenseless" cargo ships. Some have speculated that the sinking of the Lusitania may be
one of the unintended consequences of this shift in U-boat doctrine.
Due to the networked nature of most modern information systems, unintended
consequences have become increasingly probable and significant. For instance, the
intention may be to demonstrate your resolve through non-lethal means. Computer
Network Attack (CNA) appears to be the most effective means of accomplishing your
goal of darkening the enemy's capital. A virus is inserted into your opponent's main
electrical power distribution SCADA system with the intent of turning off city
streetlights. Unbeknownst to you, a large city hospital is attached to the same electrical
grid. Knocking out the electricity results in the deaths of several patients on life support
systems. Your adversary then uses the deaths as material for a propaganda blitz, turning
world opinion against you. The result, instead of strengthening your position, you have
weakened it.
5. IO: Two Approaches
If the purpose of IO/IW is to "affect adversary information systems while
defending one's own information and information systems," it becomes apparent that
there are two primary means of achieving this goal. The first approach is technical in
nature, while the second approach focuses on the psychological. The technical approach
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relies upon U.S. technological superiority to gain access to, and to manipulate, corrupt, or
destroy the data in an adversaries information systems. The desired effect of the technical
approach is to degrade or eliminate the opponents' ability to collect, process, and
disseminate information to decision-makers. The psychological approach attempts to
"convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their
emotions, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals" (Joint Pub 3-53, 1996, p. 12). The purpose is to
"induce or reinforce foreign attitudes, and behavior favorable to the originator's
objectives" (p. 12).
Either approach can utilize the precepts of the other. For instance, perception
management is the altering of a person's or organization's perception of reality. It can be
accomplished through limiting, overloading or distorting the data used by an entity to
make a decision. Perception management can be accomplished through either technical or
non-technical means. Active, technical means can include injecting false information into'
a data stream through CNA. Non-technical means may include the use of military
deception. Forward deploying aircraft to a specific airfield, for observation by your
adversary, is an example of a passive, non-technical means of feeding false data into your
opponent's OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop. The likelihood of success of each






Table 4.1: Likelihood of Success of PSYOPS or Technical Approaches to IO/IW
Against Different "Wave Progressions."
Information systems include both the decision-makers and the infrastructure that
supports the decision-making process. Offensively, IW attempts to influence the
decision-maker or effect the infrastructure that supports decision-making. Supporting
infrastructure includes those systems that collect, process, and disseminate information to
the decision-makers. Defensively, 10 must protect the supporting structure and the
decision-maker from the adversary. The OODA loop is a simple model that illustrates the





Figure 4.1: The OODA Loop
First-wave opponents are the least likely to be susceptible to U.S. "technical"
approaches to IO/IW primarily because the information systems utilized by those
societies will not be reliant upon networked computers. Societal structure and
interpersonal relationships are key factors in first-wave information systems. Most
technology associated with first-wave information systems will be mechanical or stand-
alone, making manipulation, corruption, or interception of data nearly impossible. Second
and third-wave societies will be more vulnerable to the "technical" approach simply
because their information systems and decision-makers are more reliant upon networked
computer and mechanical systems to collect, manipulate, and disseminate data.
Success of the IO/IW psychological approach will depend upon the number and
type of information sources available to a society. Those with limited sources may be
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unable to confirm or deny "suspect'* information, while societies with multiple
information avenues will be able to crosscheck "suspect" information through other
sources.
The types of information sources available to a society will also affect the success
of the psychological approach. It will be easier for the U.S. to use its technological
superiority to inject its "message" into second and third-wave societies, but they may
have less effect due to the ability to "crosscheck." Though the U.S. may have a more
difficult time accessing first-wave societies information systems, it will be easier to
disseminate the "message" once in, since there are only a limited number of information
avenues.
6. Relative Information Superiority
Information dominance conveys the idea of total awareness of an environment. It
implies that one side has "near perfect" knowledge of a situation which allows it freedom
of maneuver. Relative information superiority suggests that one side has more
information than the adversary. Their knowledge of the environment may not be very-
good, but it is better than the opponent's.
The implication is that it is neither necessary (nor possible) to achieve information
dominance. A small advantage in the amount or type of information one opponent has
over another can produce a disproportionate positive result. For example, two fighter
pilots engaged in aerial combat may know the speed, armament, and range of their
adversary's plane. It could be assumed that the engagement could go to either side, but
suppose one pilot knows the other's tactics. Armed with that information, the pilot will
have a decided advantage.
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7. IW Targeting and Combat Assessment
Targeteering involves matching a target with the appropriate weapon to produce a
desired effect. That effect may be to deny, disrupt, destroy, or deceive & exploit. Combat
assessment determines whether you have achieved your desired effect. To make this
determination, targeteers must develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that reflect
progress toward the desired effect. For example, if the desired effect is to make an enemy
runway unusable, an appropriate MOE may be length of usable runway after an attack. If
the length is less than that required for aircraft to operate, it can be inferred that the
runway is "unusable" and that you have achieved your "desired effect."
Defining telling MOEs for many IW methods is difficult. Manipulation of an
opponent's databases through CNA or psychological operations against an adversary's
decision-makers, may provide no direct causal effect that can be measured. Bombs
explode, physical structures disappear. Data is corrupted in a fuel distribution system,
what is the immediate effect that can be measured? It may take several hours, days, or
weeks for the effects to be seen or felt. And once fuel shortages occur, who can say with
certainty what caused it? Maybe it was the air raid that destroyed a key bridge, or the
SOF direct-action (DA) operation that convinced workers to stay away from the
distillation plant. Either way, the tenuous causal chain between the attack and the
"desired effect" can create difficulties for IW proponents in convincing commanders of
the utility of IW attacks.
8. IW Targeting and the "Desired Effect" Question
Tension exists between the two most common desired effects for a target (destroy
vs. deceive & exploit). Is it best to destroy a target, or to "protect" it because it provides
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entry into the opponents information systems? A cost-benefit analysis must be conducted
to determine the worth of both approaches. The worth of either approach is normally a
function of time. The longer the "target" is maintained as a source of information or
avenue for access, the less utility it will yield as the campaign progresses. At that time,
destruction of the target is warranted.
C. SWOT ANALYSIS
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
/ Impact of investigation of IO/IW






and 3rd wave societies
s Ability to achieve "desired effects"
from a distance
s Information-in-war technologies
S Over dependence on information-in-
war technologies
S Technological superiority ineffective






s Increased intelligence requirements
forlO





S Opportunity to create "technology
dependencies" world-wide
S Volume of information compounds
"access" and "specificity" problem
S Vulnerability to foreign "technology
dependence"
•S Possible WMD responses to IO/IW
attacks
s Vulnerability created by rapid
modernization
Table 4.2: SWOT Analysis of U.S. IO/IW Capabilities
1. Strengths and Weaknesses of U.S. IO/IW Capabilities
The primary strength of U.S. IO/IW is the emphasis placed upon the investigation
of IO strategies, IW applications, and their potential impact on warfare. Being among the
first to think through the ramifications of IO/IW allows the U.S. to identify information
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system vulnerabilities, and to develop defenses. Identifying our own vulnerabilities also
assists the U.S. in identifying vulnerabilities of potential adversaries.
Technological superiority over many first, second and third-wave societies
provides the U.S. with a means of applying many of the concepts and strategies
developed through investigation of IO/IW. Hackerwarfare, IBW, and CNA all depend
upon computers, routers, servers, and fiber optic cable. The U.S. is a world leader in the
production and application of these technologies. As such, it possesses a large population
with the skills required to carry out these types of operations.
IO/IW may allow the U.S. to achieve desired effects from a greater distance and
at less cost. CNA, IBW, EBW, PSYOP, hackerwarfare, and cyberwarfare can all be
accomplished from a distance. The increasingly interconnected systems of the world will
allow the U.S. to access an adversary's information systems through cyberspace. They all
require less support in terms of manpower and equipment to conduct.
The ability to collect, process, filter, and disseminate relevant information to the
appropriate decision-makers, at the right time, will increase U.S. IO/IW application
effectiveness. Information-in-war technologies may also provide increased security and
reliability to U.S. information systems through networking and encryption.
The primary weakness of U.S. IO/IW may be our dependence upon information-
in-war technologies. The computer has become an integral part of most weapon systems,
making them susceptible to many of the viruses, worms, and logic bombs that have
effected civilian systems. Many are tied together in networks that supply targeting and C2
information. Our weapon systems have become dependent upon this information for
successful operation. These information links will thus likely become prime targets for
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our adversaries. For example, without a functioning GPS system, many next generation
PGMs become useless. Disruption of the theater air control system could reduce U.S. air
campaigns to uncoordinated strikes. Disruption of satellite communications could inhibit
forces operating out of line-of-sight of command centers.
U.S. technological superiority may also prove to be ineffective when directed
against first- and second-wave information systems. How do you conduct a CNA when
an opponent does not use computers? How do you intercept signals with satellites when
they use drums to communicate?
2. Opportunities for, and Threats to, U.S. IO/IW Capabilities
IO/IW may provide the U.S. with the opportunity to decrease the number of
casualties on both sides during future conflicts. As targets shift from the physical to the
informational, the lethality of war may decrease. For instance, attacks on opponents' C2
systems may be possible through computer viruses, instead of by GBU-27 2,000-lb.
bombs. Enemy commanders and decision-makers may be rendered ineffective through
focused, personalized PSYOP campaigns. IBW may produce even greater precision in
weapon systems, decreasing collateral damage. The logic being the more precise
intelligence fed directly into a weapon, the greater probability that it will be targeted
against "the right target."
The type and amount of intelligence required to conduct many IO/IW operations
is. substantially different from requirements for second-wave, conventional warfare.
Physical location will give way in importance to functional location of information
systems. How information systems are logically connected and how they are used to
support decision-makers at all levels will become of prime importance. Weapon system
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order-of-battle (OB) intelligence will give way to information system OB. Current U.S.
technical means of collecting intelligence may become obsolete, or at the very least will
have to change drastically. Determining the types of computers, operating systems, and
communications protocols will require access to the system through cyberspace or
through physical presence. Cyberspace access in particular faces the problem of
specificity. The amount of information passing through cyberspace continues to increase.
Identifying what is relevant and what is not will make successful application of IO/IW
technologies more difficult.
Pioneering critical information system technologies may allow the U.S. to create
worldwide "dependencies." As a major producer and supplier of computers, cellular
communications, internet hardware, and microprocessor chips, it may be possible to
implant "backdoors", logic bombs, and a variety of Trojan Horses that could allow the
U.S. to gain access to, or shut-down an opponents' system.
Just as the U.S. may be able to create technology dependencies, other nations may
be able to "mirror image" this strategy. More and more software is being created
overseas. For example, India is a large producer of programs, many of which are used by
U.S. private and commercial information systems. An adversary could take advantage of
this and recruit "insiders" to chip software destined for the U.S.
Paradoxically, changing technologies and increasing the gap between the U.S. and
other first, second, and third-wave societies may create a window of vulnerability. First,
transition to a new technology entails changes in doctrine, organization, and strategy.
Effectiveness drops until operators become proficient in the new methods of doing
business. New technologies may also have different vulnerabilities that may not have yet
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been identified. In addition, if the U.S. does not extract the most utility from each
technology before progressing to the next, it risks wasting resources and losing its
comparative advantage over potential adversaries. Second-wave technology may be able
to be employed in such a manner that it allows adversaries to innovate around newer,
third-wave technologies.
For instance, during World War II Germany opted to spend its limited resources
on next-generation "vengeance" weapons designed to win the war (Overy, 1996). V-ls,
V-2s, and Me-262 jet fighters were so advanced that they could only be produced in
small numbers. This competition for resources strangled production of proven systems
such as the Me- 109 and Focke-Wulf 190 fighters. The Allies decided against leaping to
the next technology, focusing instead on improving and expanding production of existing
systems, such as the P-51 Mustang. In the end, older technologies beat out the newer
ones.
If IO/IW is perceived as a form of WMD, the response of an adversary to an I
W
attack becomes of great importance. Current Russian policy calls for nuclear retaliation
for any IW attack. This disproportionate response may limit the U.S. ability to employ
IO/IW against opponents armed with NBC weapons, if such a threat can be made
credibly.
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D. UTILITY OF U.S. IO/IW
Utility refers to the types of tasks that a discipline can perform and how well it
can accomplish them. Colin Gray (1996) uses four questions to determine a disciplines
utility.
WHAT UNIQUELY, CAN THE DISCIPLINE DO?
s Highlight the vulnerability of information systems, and the potential impact of
those vulnerabilities on future warfare
S Disrupt second and third-wave information systems, in a non-destructive manner,
from a distance to achieve "desired effects"
WHAT CAN THE DISCIPLINE DO WELL?
S Provide potentially non-lethal means of achieving "desired effects"
S Reduce casualties on both sides through PGMs enhanced with IBW
S Achieve disproportionate effects in relation to resources required to conduct the
operation
S Substitute for traditional forms of power (conventional, second-wave ground, air,
and naval forces) when facing second and third-wave adversaries
S Enhance the effectiveness of SOF and GPF
WHAT DOES THE DISCIPLINE DO POORLY?
S Disrupt first-wave information systems
S Compellence, deterrence, and coercion; demonstrative effects of IO/IW to date
have been poor
WHAT IS THE DISCIPLINE UNABLE TO DO?
S_ Provide "physical presence"
Table 4.3: Utility of U.S. IO/IW Capabilities
1. What Uniquely, Can the Discipline Do?
U.S. IO/IW has two primary utilities: 1. Highlight the vulnerability of information
systems, and the potential impact of those vulnerabilities on future warfare; and 2.
Disrupt second, and third-wave information systems in a variety of ways, from a distance,
to achieve primarily strategic objectives. IO/IW provides a lens through which to assess
potential adversaries and U.S. information systems. Identification of weaknesses allows
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the U.S. to develop both offensive and defensive strategies for dealing with information
system vulnerabilities.
Technological superiority provides the U.S. with the means to conduct CNA,
IBW, C2W, PSYOPs, and perception management from a distance. Conducting
operations at a distance reduces the number of friendly troops in range of your opponent,
decreasing the number of potential casualties.
2. What Can the Discipline Do Well?
U.S. IO/IW can do five things well: 1. Provide potentially "non-lethal" means of
achieving desired effects; 2. Reduce friendly, and enemy casualties through PGMs
enhanced by IBW; 3. Achieve disproportionate effects in relation to resources required to
conduct the operation; 4. Substitute for traditional forms of power (conventional ground
forces, airpower, & naval forces) when facing second and third-wave adversaries; and 5.
Enhance the effectiveness of SOF and GPF.
IO/IW provides several "non-lethal" means of achieving a variety of "desired
effects" (deny, disrupt, destroy, deceive & exploit). Corruption of data through CNA, or
the use of High Power Microwaves (HPM) and High Energy Radio Frequency (HERF)
weapons may allow the U.S. to achieve the full gamut of desired effects against computer
based information systems. Psychological operations against key decision-makers may be
tailored to produce a variety of desired effects, including defection, sympathy with the
enemy, or disloyalty. Enemy casualties may be reduced through increased precision
targeting of PGMs using IBW. Availability of better intelligence during the targeting of
PGMs ensures that weapons hit the "right target." Being able to identify, and hit the
"right target" the first time, may reduce collateral damage.
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IO/IW can produce effects disproportionate to the resources required to conduct
the operation. CNA destruction of an enemy logistical database may inhibit the
mobilization and deployment of their forces, all for the cost of a skilled operator and an
average computer. IO/IW can substitute for traditional forms of power when facing
second and third-wave adversaries. U.S. IO/IW capabilities provide the ability to achieve
many of the same desired effects that are possible with conventional air, naval, and
ground forces. For instance, CNA, IBW, C2W, PSYOPS, and perception management,
can degrade command and control of enemy forces, or incapacitate weapon systems
through semantic attacks. SOF and GPF effectiveness and efficiency may be enhanced
through the use of IO/IW. Achieving information superiority will allow U.S. forces to
avoid enemy strengths, precisely identify targets, and focus efforts on true enemy centers
of gravity.
3. What Does the Discipline Do Poorly?
U.S. IO/IW currently has a limited ability to conduct three tasks: 1. Disrupt first-
wave information systems; 2. Compel or deter; and 3. Substitute for traditional forms of
power when facing first-wave adversaries. By avoiding computer information system
dependency, first-wave societies negate the technological advantage held by the U.S. The
psychological approach becomes by default the only means of affecting first-wave
information systems. This requires understanding of the information avenues they do
have, and cultural sensitivity to the society's "story." The U.S. has a poor track record in
both areas. U.S. IO/IW has failed to demonstrate an ability to compel or deter potential
opponents. EIW, PSYOPS, IBW, C2W, and perception management have failed to
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ensure Saddam Hussein complies with United Nations resolutions. 14 Mismatched
capabilities and targets limit the substitutability of U.S. IO/IW for conventional forces
when facing first-wave adversaries.
4. What Is the Discipline Unable To Do?
U.S. IO/IW is unable to provide the effects of "physical presence." 15 Physical
presence provides a visible sign of commitment that is difficult to duplicate with IO/IW.
Just like AP, IO/IW in all likelihood cannot alone defeat an army in the field. Information
systems and decision-makers at that level will have a greater resiliency to both the
technical and psychological approaches once engaged. Even if their information systems
can be accessed, it will not immediately affect the ability of the individual soldier to
continue the fight. That will require someone to remove the weapon from his hands.
14
There is no evidence of a coherent, protracted IO/IW campaign designed to compel compliance
with UN resolutions. Just as random applications of conventional forms of power are unlikely to have an
effect, fragmented/disjointed applications of IO/IW are unlikely to achieve the United Nations "desired
effect."
15 The authors are aware that as part of USSOCOM's FID mission, there are small SOF teams
deployed in over 144 countries. Physical presence, as discussed here, refers to the effects generated by
large numbers of ground troops.
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V. AIRPOWER
Although the breadth and scope of future operations may be different, AP will
continue to support the policies employed by our government to influence the behavior of
other state, and non-state actors. AP's global range and versatile capabilities provide our
leaders with a viable option when dealing with world crises. In a future characterized by
predominantly niche competitors, the critical question is, how can AP be used to achieve
national security objectives through actions designed to deter, or coerce other actors into
behaving in a manner that is consistent with our national interests?
The attributes of AP are well suited to the post-Cold War environment where,
according to one study, "The time lines are short; the cost of failure high; and accurate,
and timely information, and action is critical" (Fogelman, 1997). AP can be employed
across the entire spectrum of operations from peacekeeping to total war. In order to
maximize the utility of AP against niche competitors its limitations must be recognized,
but more importantly the benefits derived from increased mobility/reach, flexible/scalable
lethality, and increased precision targeting must be exploited (see Table 1.1 for the tenets
ofAP).' 6
Again, we will define key terms and concepts in order to provide the reader with a
baseline understanding of AP. The SWOT analysis will be the primary tool used to divine
the utility of AP in relation to our SOFIA doctrine.
The tenets of AP and how they apply to AP specifically should not be confused with how the
same characteristics are used to explain the synergistic effects that can be achieved through the combined
strength of SOF, 10, and AP.
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A. DEFINITIONS
Winston Churchill once wrote: "Airpower is the most difficult of all forms of
military force to measure or even express in precise terms" (Fogelman, 1997). AP
ultimately encompasses the broad realm of air and space assets from all branches of the
Armed Services, as well as coalition forces. However, this study will have a narrower
scope. It will focus primarily on USAF assets, definitions, and terms to explain the utility
ofAP.
What AP can achieve is outlined by the Air Force's Core competencies: air
superiority, global attack, agile combat support, rapid global mobility, and precision
engagement (AFDD1, 1997, p. 39). These characteristics are the backbone of AP, and the
underlying concepts from which Air Force doctrine is formed. We will use these concepts
to explore the effectiveness of AP, but more importantly how these concepts will apply
against niche competitors. We will conduct a SWOT analysis to determine the utility of
AP and the contributions it can make to a SOFIA doctrine.
B. CONCEPTS
The Air Force vision of "Global Reach—Global Power" and the military's joint
vision of "Full Spectrum Dominance" highlight plans to meet U.S. strategic objectives
for the 21
st
Century. These strategies outline how the U.S. will wage war against
traditional competitors, but explain less well how the U.S. will deal with the more likely-
niche competitor. Another problem that will have to be addressed is how to deter a niche
competitor from ever thinking about challenging the United States.
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1. Early Views ofAP
Early AP theorists, Brig. General William "Billy" Mitchell, Giulio Douhet, and
Alexander De Seversky all saw AP as the new means to conduct war, although they may
have over exaggerated its effectiveness. They all believed that wars could be won in the
air. Mitchell defined AP as, "the ability to do something in the air. It consists of
transporting all sorts of things by aircraft from one place to another"(Melinger, 1997, p.
xii). He believed that AP could function independently and be used for far more than
supporting land and sea forces. Strategic bombing could bring about victory by
destroying the enemy's war-making capability and their will to fight. Mitchell strongly
believed that an independent Air Force could achieve this victory without ground forces
by bombing the enemy's vital centers making it impossible for the enemy to continue
waging war (p. 79). -
Italian General Giulio Douhet believed that the control of the air would become
crucial to war fighting. He understood the effects AP could achieve by virtue of its speed,
flexibility, range, and firepower. The two places that he may have exaggerated the
effectiveness of AP were in the notion that whoever controlled the air would also control
the ground and the psychological effects that bombing would have on civilian
populations (Melinger, 1997, p. xiv).
Alexander De Seversky, a WWII fighter ace, was another strong advocate of AP
who thought that a finite number of planes and bombs, delivered on specific targets,
would equal victory. He also believed that destroying selected targets could achieve
victory (Melinger, 1 997, p. 268) and downplayed the relative importance of armies and
navies, in comparison with AP (p. 269).
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2. U.S. Strategy
The National Security Strategy for a New Century outlines America's three central
goals: 1 . To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight, and win; 2.
To bolster America's economic revitalization; and 3. To promote democracy abroad
(United States, 1998).
The National Military Strategy supports these goals through its policy of shape,
respond, and prepare now. This strategy is designed to protect the Nation and its interests,
and promote a peace that benefits America and all like-minded nations.
This strategy includes a new, special emphasis on the critical importance of an
early, decisive halt to armed aggression to provide wider options for the use of military
force, and to create a window for diplomatic resolution of a crisis. The ability to achieve
this strategy depends on the speed, range, agility, and overwhelming firepower that AP
can offer. This strategy is founded on the assumption that, with technology, a more agile
aerospace force can substitute for large, slow-arriving forces and deliver more firepower
in the process. This initial action will presumably minimize the number of friendly
casualties, and help to solidify political support for military action (United States Air
Force, 1998, p. 4).
3. Global Reach—Global Power
The Air Force vision for the 21 st century is to ensure that the national security of
the U.S. is protected during an era defined by fast breaking crises and diverse
contingencies. This global vision is based on the objectives of: sustaining deterrence,
providing versatile combat forces; supplying rapid, global air mobility; controlling the
high ground; ensuring information dominance; and building U.S. influence. By utilizing
74
the capabilities of speed, range, maneuverability, and precise, lethal firepower, U.S. AP
will be unchallenged directly and can fully support the global vision (Sheila E. Widnall).
This vision fails to point out that in situations where AP is unable to locate and target the
adversary because of terrain or population masking, the role of AP may have limited
effectiveness.
4. Full Spectrum Dominance
Current U.S. military policy concentrates on creating joint doctrine that can be
applied to a broad spectrum of potential adversaries. This vision is based on the concept
of full spectrum dominance. Joint Vision 2010 outlines how this objective can be
achieved through the integration of four concepts; (dominant maneuver, precision




Integrated properly, these concepts will enable our forces to achieve
full spectrum dominance against most second, and some third-wave adversaries. AP's
capabilities are vital to successful control of the battlefield, and are directly proportional
to the ability to acquire and target the enemy.
5. Deterrent Capability
Forces that cannot win will not deter.
Nathan F. Twining (Westenhoff, 1990, p. 72)
AP has a mixed record regarding its ability to deter potential adversaries. It is
difficult to prove a causal relationship between AP and its effectiveness as a deterrent,
however AP remains essential in supporting the foundation of U.S. military strategy to
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deter conflict by providing a credible and lethal force that is capable of reaching out and
touching the enemy. According to Colin Gray (1996) in his book Explorations In Strategy,
there are two theories of deterrence, punishment and denial. "In principle, a candidate
enemy may be deterrable either by the threat to punish him in ways that hurt him very
badly or by the threat to defeat his armed forces in the field and thereby deny him
achievement of his objectives" (p. 33). Alexander George and William Simon (1994), in
their book on coercive diplomacy, define deterrence as "a strategy that employs threats to
dissuade an adversary from undertaking a damaging action not yet initiated'' and coercive
diplomacy as "a response to an action already undertaken" (pp. 7-8).
Airpowers deterrent utility is based upon its ability to hold adversary's vital
organs at risk. "Vital organs" are those entities that the opponent places the greatest value
on and may include leadership, population, infrastructure, armed forces, or territory. State
actors will be the most responsive to AP's deterrent effect. Non-state actors will be the
least vulnerable, and in fact may be encouraged to challenge the U.S. when only
threatened with AP.
Prior to operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, U.S. AP had a
questionable track record in regards to its deterrent capability. It is arguable that against
the Soviet Union, a conventional second-wave peer competitor, AP was instrumental in
deterring conflict. Long range bombers equipped with nuclear weapons and a credible
ability to penetrate Soviet airspace allowed U.S. AP to hold most of its vital organs at
risk. In Vietnam, AP was unable to deter the North's support for first-wave,
1
For more information on the definition and concepts of "Full Spectrum Dominance" refer to The
Air Force and Joint Vision 2010, pp. 24-28, 36.
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unconventional guerrilla's fighting in the South. It was also unable to deter the Viet Cong
from operating autonomously in the South, regardless of support from the North. Due to
political restrictions, AP was unable to hold at risk many of North Vietnams vital organs.
Leadership and infrastructure were for the most part off-limits. In the South, the Viet
Cong had neither territory nor recognizable concentrations of armed forces that could be
held at risk by U.S. AP.
While AP may have failed to deter Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait, its
deterrent utility has increased since its exceptional performance during DESERT
STORM. In October 1994, the U.S. deployed 122 combat aircraft to Southwest Asia in
ten days, in response to a buildup of Iraqi armor on the Kuwaiti border. Within days,
Iraqi forces had begun to withdraw from border areas. As former Secretary of Defense
William Perry commented, "When we deployed F-15s, F-16s, and A- 10s in large
numbers, I think they got the message very quickly" (Fogelman, 1 997)
The demonstrative effect of APs ability to hold at risk states vital organs was also
successfully applied in Kosovo. In October 1998, NATO conducted several days of air
exercises with the intent of convincing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to
comply with United Nations (UN) resolutions regarding protection of ethnic Albanians
within the region. Within weeks a settlement was reached that included a withdrawal of
Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo and the introduction of international observers.
C. SWOT ANALYSIS
In his book Explorations In Strategy, Colin Gray (1996) conducted an in-depth
review of AP from which he developed a list of its primary utilities (p. 99).
Unfortunately, his work fails to capture the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
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threats associated with AP when pitted against our most probable future adversaries
(first- and third-wave niche competitors). Table 5.1 summarizes our analysis of AP from
which we will determine this utility.
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
S Speed, range, flexibility, reaction time,
mobility
s Economy of force
S Lift capability
s Core competencies
1. Air and Space superiority
2. Global reach/rapid mobility
3. Agile combat support
4. Precision engagement/strike
capability
s High percentage of units self-
deployable




s Limited Battlespace control
S Staying power: Limited individual
platform endurance during operations
(0-24 hours)
s Long lead time for training competent
airmen/aircrew
s Requires fixed airfields and large
support infrastructure for sustained
operations (low tooth-to-tail ratio)
S Aircraft vulnerable when on the
ground
s Implementation of technological
superiority against first-wave
societies...high tech vs. low tech
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS
s Technology. . increasing capability
1. Reduced requirement for fixed
airfields and support infrastructure
(V/STOL, increased platform
capabilities)
2. Reduced requirement for aircrew
(UAV/UCAV)
s Situational awareness
S Degradation of Combat Power
1. Retention rates of pilots
2. High operation/personnel tempo
. . .small number of forces in too
high demand
s Technological Achilles ' heal
1. Increasing sophistication of IADS
2. Decreasing size of armed
forces. . .scarce resources
S Conventional Culture
Table 5.1: SWOT Analysis of U.S. Airpower
1. Strengths of U.S. AP Capabilities
Airpowers primary strengths are speed, range, and flexibility. From these three
bedrock strengths, a multitude of secondary strengths may be derived. Key among these
is the ability to react within hours to developing situations worldwide either through
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precision attack, establishment of air superiority over the contested area or deployment of
U.S. forces using air mobility assets.
Precision attack reduces the number of sorties and weapons required to service a
target. These attacks can be carried out by forward deployed aircraft, or launched from
the U.S., as in the case of 8th Air Force B-52 strikes conducted from Barksdale AFB,
Louisiana during operation DESERT STORM. Another example of the power of
precision attack is the 20 August 1998 Tomahawk cruise missile attack on the Shifa
Pharmaceutical Plant in Khartoum, Sudan and a terrorist training area in Afghanistan.
While air superiority cannot guarantee that a ground or naval action will be successful, it
does provide the U.S. with the ability to maneuver forces free from harassment from the
air. Tactical and strategic airlift provides the U.S. the ability to move a variety of forces
within hours of a crisis, to include self-deployment of U.S. strike, attack, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and bomber platforms.
Air superiority, coupled with a precision strike capability (the combination of
precise target acquisition, munitions, and weapons delivery) gives AP the ability to
exploit the vertical dimension thereby gaining limited control over the battlespace. AP
can not ensure that the ground campaign will be successful, but it does provide greater
mobility and freedom of movement. Dominating the airways keeps logistical traffic
unimpeded, making sure that troops, equipment, and supplies are delivered when, and
where they need to be.
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In World War II, the Eighth Air Force attacked something like 50 target
sets in all of 1943. During DESERT STORM, the coalition struck 150
individual targets in the first 24 hours of that 1 00-hour war. But very early
in the next century, the Air Force may be able to engage 1,500 targets
within the first hour, if not the first minutes of a conflict.
Gen. Ronald R. Fogelman (1997)
Precision attack is the second half of the AP equation making target acquisition
and destruction more effective. More accurate weapon systems and discrete targeting will
ultimately reduce the number of sorties flown and the number of weapons required for
each individual target. AP's ability to identify and destroy a is dependent upon accurate
intelligence. AP will rely on information superiority to identify critical command and
control nodes to manipulate or destroy the enemy's OODA loop.
Air Force Special Operations Command's (AFSOC) ability to quickly adapt to a
variety of environments and specialization in unconventional tactics gives them an edge
over conventional forces when facing the U.S.'s most probable future adversaries.
AFSOC is equipped with specially modified fixed-wing (MC-130 E/H/P, AC- 130 H/U)
and rotary wing (MH-53J/MH-60) aircraft. These aircraft are equipped with a variety of
PNP systems to included GPS, Doppler, inertial navigation system (INS), TF/TA radar,
weather radar, forward looking infrared (FLIR), and threat detection/threat avoidance
electronic warfare suites that allow them to operate at low-level at night. Highly
competent crews using state of the art equipment, maintain the ability to penetrate
virtually undetected into the most austere and potentially hostile locations in the world
with a very small footprint. Their expertise in the area of navigation and ability to
construct airborne instrument approaches allows them to pinpoint their destination and
create landing opportunities that would otherwise be impossible. Their continuous
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scenario-based training 18 provides SOF with the unique ability to tailor force packages to
match the specific operation.
The MC-130E has the capability to refuel both the MH-60 and the MH-53 and is
able to receive gas from either the KC-10 or the KC-135 giving that combination of
aircraft unlimited range and staying power over the target area. 19 With this capability it is
possible to design force packages with small footprints that can accomplish a wide
assortment of tasks.
2. Weaknesses of U.S. AP Capabilities
One general inference to be drawn has been that in twentieth-century war,
defeat will almost always be avoided (and outright victory likely gained)
by the side that has secured air superiority. Indeed, a more comprehensive
perusal would probably show that virtually the only exceptions concern
counterinsurgency warfare.
Neville Brown (Westenhoff, 1990, p. 39)
Although air superiority proved essential to a quick victory in the Gulf it may not
always be the defining factor in determining the outcome of conflicts, especially when
dealing with asymmetric warfare. Vietnam is an example where air superiority was
unable to guarantee victory on the ground. Niche competitors fighting asymmetrically
will limit the role of AP by preventing it from utilizing its overwhelming capabilities to
exploit the battlespace.
18 SOF aircrews continuously fly scripted real world missions practicing simulated airfield
seizures, and deep in country penetration while accomplishing the infiltration and exfiltration of troops and
equipment.
19 Some SOF aircraft have the ability to self-deploy. Two MC-130E Combat Talons flew 28.4
hours from Hurlburt Field, FL to Prince Sultan AB, Saudi Arabia. This flight required four in-flight
refuelings and an augmented crew to achieve. Major T.R. Sands, USAF, Aircraft Commander, 8SOS,
Hurlburt Field, FL.
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AP offers a highly capable force that can be lethal in its execution, but its ability
to deter is arguable in an environment that is more ambiguous than the conventional
confrontations that have characterized past wars. The fewer the targets of strategic
importance that a country has the less it is threatened by them being destroyed. Relying
on AP to deter an adversary who is not protecting territory or against an enemy who is
able to hide behind a "veil of anonymity"20 greatly increases the probability of failure.
The ability to keep aircraft on station is difficult due to dependence on fuel and
limited munitions. These limitations may be mitigated through air refueling, but aircraft
must still return to base (RTB) when it exhausts its munitions. Crew duty day restrictions
and high maintenance requirements limit continual employment, which can be overcome
only by increasing the number of platforms. An enemy who is able to effectively terrain
mask can wait out AP and can gain limited maneuverability. This forces the U.S. to use
valuable assets to maintain "eyes on target," which may further expose aircrews to the
danger of enemy firepower.
Technological superiority may not generate the expected benefits in the future.
Stealth fighters and bombers will have limited utility against first-wave competitors who
are target poor. Fighting low-tech conflicts with high-tech equipment may prove to be
very expensive and very ineffective. Widening the technological gap provides the enemy
with the opportunity to innovate around us and exploit our weaknesses.
' Gordon McCormick, Low-Intensity Conflict, course offered in the SOLIC curriculum, Naval
Postgraduate School, Fall, 1997. The "Veil of Anonymity" exists when an enemy cannot be targeted until
they present themselves in the open. They may either blend into the environment or into the population.
The Vietcong were able to blend in with the South Vietnamese people and pick the time and place of their
choosing to wage battle.
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3. Opportunities for U.S. AP Capabilities
Technology will ensure that AP stays on the cutting edge. Innovations in stealth
technology, aircraft systems, GPS, active and passive radar systems, navigational
systems, and "smart''/"brilliant' ' weapons will add to the arsenal of weapons that AP can
bring to bear against the enemy. These, along with other technological advances will
further widen the gap between the U.S. and future adversaries making it difficult for them
to challenge the U.S. directly.
V/STOL (vertical/short field takeoff and landing) and UAV/UCAV (unmanned
aerial vehicle/uninhabited combat aerial vehicle) add a new dimension to AP that will
provide commanders varied force employment options against niche competitors who are
not threatened by overwhelming force.
The CV-22 OSPREY is a V/STOL aircraft that the Air Force is predicting will
define the way SOF will operate in the future. Its defensive systems, cargo carrying
capacity, inflight refueling capability and range make it an ideal platform for infiltrating
small force packages into non-permissive environments. Another great contribution to
AP is the remote controlled UAV that has a loiter time of up to 40 hours. UAV's make it
possible to operate in high-risk environments without endangering aircrews. Accurate
and timely decisions can be made by commanders utilizing real-time imagery that is
passed by satellite links ("Air Force Unveils Predator UAV," 1997). The UCAV is a
conceptual development of a highly sophisticated vehicle, able to withstand plus-or-
minus twenty-G's, making it capable of defeating nearly all opposing antiaircraft
missiles. These vehicles will have unlimited reach and can easily be controlled by a pilot
halfway around the world by fiber optics and satellite links (Lambeth, 1996).
83
These new platforms will add to the robustness of AP by providing a cheaper,
more effective means of gathering intelligence, conducting surveillance and
reconnaissance, as well as providing viable strike platforms. Unmanned systems which
possess the flexibility to change, cancel, and reprioritize targeting assignments while in
flight could reduce the cost and the personnel risk associated with manned aircraft.
Technology may make it to where even troop transport can be accomplished with these
vehicles by using them to infiltrate or exfiltrate teams through enemy defensive systems.
Stealth technology adds even more to our capability by allowing AP to penetrate
and destroy targets while remaining virtually undetected. The F-22 RAPTOR with its
stealth technology is planned to come on line in the year 2004. The Air Force plans to
procure 442 F-22's replacing its top of line, but aging F-15 (Lambeth, 1996). Stealth
capability enhanced with the capabilities of future technology in sensors, precision
weapons, and awareness aids will play a vital role in making sure no adversary can match
our aerial superiority. Future munitions will have near-zero-miss-distance accuracies that
may allow them to be smaller, requiring less of them to be built. Next generation sensor-
fused smart weapons will have the ability to recognize, identify, and sort targets as their
sensors guide them, giving them greater accuracy (1996).
Improved situational awareness may prove to be the greatest opportunity available
to AP in the next century. The ability to package and implement global information
pertaining to threat status, target location, individual aircraft status, mission status, and
ground troop location will maximize U.S. situational awareness while denying it to the
enemy.
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4. Threats to U.S. AP Capabilities
Retention of qualified aircrew is a growing threat to the combat readiness of U.S.
AP. The increasing exodus of military pilots from all services poses a particularly
difficult problem. Most pilots require up to two years of training prior to being certified
"mission ready". Pilots who leave the service today take with them years of experience
that cannot be replaced with newly minted aircrew members. The result is a smaller and
less experienced force that is unable (with current production rates) to regenerate itself.
Personnel that remain in the service experience higher PERSTEMPOs caused by both
higher OPSTEMPOs and a smaller force; combined they have the potential to negatively
impact combat readiness.
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D. UTILITY OF U.S. AP
Utility refers to the types of tasks that a discipline can perform and how well it
can accomplish them. Colin Gray (1996) uses four questions to determine a disciplines
utility.
WHAT UNIQUELY, CAN THE DISCIPLINE DO?
S Provide timely global mobility to U.S. forces (hours vs. days/weeks/months)
s Conduct world-wide offensive military operations from CONUS locations
S Deliver PGMs
S Bypass adversaries fielded military forces and strike strategically
S Successfully conduct massive, debilitating, parallel strikes on second and third-
wave societies (both peer competitor and small state niche competitors)
WHAT CAN THE DISCIPLINE DO WELL?
S Task organize
s Achieve "desired effects" in greater proportion to resources expended
s Mobilize and deploy quickly
S Maintain "aerial occupation" of enemy territory in regions in which U.S. is able to
"sense" adversary (primarily desert or ocean)
S Employ multi-spectral "sensing" technologies (visible, non-visible, RF, acoustic)
for target identification
S Collect, process, produce, and disseminate near-real time intelligence
S Conduct operations at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of war
WHAT DOES THE DISCIPLINE DO POORLY?
_
S Effectively/efficiently engage first-wave societies
S Effectively/efficiently identify and engage niche competitors
WHAT IS THE DISCIPLINE UNABLE TO DO?
s Provide the "effects" of physical presence
Table 5.2: Utility of U.S. Airpower
1. What Uniquely, Can the Discipline Do?
Speed, range, and lift allow AP to provide timely, global mobility of U.S. forces
much faster than sea or land transport. The ability to utilize speed and range allows the
U.S. to engage the enemy from the CONUS with devastating effect. Conducting
offensive air strikes from the U.S. reduces the need to deploy personnel and equipment to
more dangerous forward staging bases. B-52s from
(
Barksdale AFB, Louisiana conducted
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bombing operations against Iraq during the Gulf War, which freed up valuable ramp
space at forward staging bases for fighters, tankers, and special operation aircraft.
AP allows you to leap over fielded military forces and deliver weapons directly
against centers of gravity, including leadership, population, and infrastructure
(Meilingerm, 1997, p. 9).
21 AP utilizes speed, range, and flexibility to provide the U.S.
the capability to conduct massive, parallel, debilitating strikes against second and third-
wave peer and small state niche competitors.
2. What Can the Discipline Do Well?
AP can provide economy of force to achieve disproportionate results by
accurately delivering PGMs that can do more damage than a whole army battalion in
coercing a second or third-wave peer competitor into complying with U.S. demands.
Threats to conduct U.S. lead airstikes were successful in forcing Yugoslavia into
complying with UN/NATO resolutions, where approximately 8000 ground forces in
neighboring Bosnia were unable to persuade Milosevic into complying with resolutions.
AP can conduct "aerial occupation" of regions in which the U.S. is able to sense
the adversary and reach out and touch him, and may be particularly effective in open
desert and ocean environments. 22 AP can use sensors in the form of RC-135 RIVET
JOINT, E-3B AWACS, E-8C JSTARS, U-2s, satellites, and UAVs to collect, process,
produce, and disseminate real time information to disrupt, preempt, deny, or counter
enemy actions. In open environments AP can seriously limit the enemy's land, sea, and
21
Giulio Douhet idea translated by Sheila Fischer.
1
U.S. and coalition forces have accomplished this in both northern and southern Iraq since the
end of the Gulf War. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH restricts Iraqi movement of aircraft and air defense
systems in the south, while NORTHERN WATCH accomplishes the same in the north.
87
air movement, thereby denying him the ability to seize, hold, or exploit objectives. Speed,
range, flexibility, and lethality allow AP to compensate for deficiencies in both land and
sea forces (Gray, 1996, p. 99).
3. What Does the Discipline Do Poorly?
AP can achieve limited effects against first-wave societies whose infrastructure is
predominately low tech. It is hard to make an impact on a society when the only targets
available to bomb are a farmer's field or a dirt road. AP has limited strategic utility
against a society that is not dependent on second- and third-wave technology. AP is not
the weapon of choice against non-state niche competitors who have no population, or
geographic region to defend. The U.S. wastes valuable assets and endangers U.S. lives
when misusing AP to seek out and destroy individual soldiers/guerrillas maneuvering in
the jungle.
4. What Is the Discipline Unable to Do?
AP is unable to provide the effects of "physical presence" in areas that AP cannot
sense, identify, and discretely target the enemy. This becomes a critical deficiency when
warfare moves away from open battle areas to urban and jungle warfare.
Colin Gray (1996) advances the ideas that AP is unable to cost-effectively
transport very large, bulky cargo, seize and hold territorial objectives, and accept an
enemy's surrender (p. 99). While this may be very true and relevant in traditional
conventional type conflicts, this shortcoming may not be as relevant or as important in
smaller scale asymmetric conflicts.
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E. CONCLUSION
Regardless of how strong the United States is, militarily and politically, our
national security interests stand to be threatened. There is some chance of being
challenged directly, where AP will likely have unmatched success against the adversary.
However, there is a greater probability of being confronted by niche competitors where
the effectiveness of AP is less clear. During these times of uncertainty and downsizing
AP will continue to play an important role in military strategy because of its versatility. If
employed properly, AP can be instrumental in the defeat of niche opponents.
How much of AP's traditional strengths can be brought to bear against future
opponents is entirely dependent on the adversary. It is imperative that SOF and AP be
employed in such a manner as to leverage the others strengths. AP will follow traditional
doctrine to achieve air superiority and achieve battlespace dominance by direct target
acquisition, and destruction when fighting peer competitors. However, when facing niche
competitors AP will more likely play a supporting role. Aerial refueling, ISR, battlefield
mobility, C2, and inter-/intra-theater airlift will be the primary missions.
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VI. SOF, IO, AND AP INTEGRATION
In previous chapters we: 1. Summarized the individual strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats associated with SOF, IO, & AP; and 2. Characterized their
robustness and utility by identifying the types of tasks, and breadth of application of each
discipline. In this chapter, we will explain how the individual disciplines can enhance the
effectiveness of the others. From this we will develop a subjective categorization of the
robustness of the SOFIA doctrine in comparison with an emphasis on GPF. Finally, we
will conclude with a review of suggested case studies for further research.
A. SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS
SOF, IO, and AP each have separate and distinct attributes. These attributes give
them the ability to successfully address a variety of situations. For instance, IO provides
the commander with the capability to disrupt second and third-wave information systems
from a distance. AP allows a commander to infiltrate long distances into denied or remote
regions. SOF provides a commander with a culturally and linguistically skilled force
capable of conducting covert and clandestine operations. Individually they may provide
part of the "answer"; together they may provide a more complete answer.
1. SWOT Considerations
In general, integration of the individual disciplines can have eight possible
outcomes (See Table 6.1). It will only be beneficial to integrate in four instances (blocks
1,2,7,8): 1. Strengths/opportunities of one negate the weaknesses/threats of another; 2.
Strengths/opportunities of one magnify the strengths/opportunities of another; 3.
Weaknesses/threats negate the weaknesses/threats of another; and 4. Weaknesses/threats
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magnify the strengths/opportunities of another. Integration is only beneficial in these four
instances because the result either magnifies an existing strength or opportunity, or
nullifies a weakness or threat. In blocks 3, 4, 5,and 6, the result of the integration of the
disciplines produces a negative result. A negative result identifies combinations of the
disciplines that do not lend themselves to the successful application of the SOFIA
doctrine.
Further analysis must be conducted to determine whether the negative outcomes
of integration outweigh the positive utilities produced by the integration of SOF, 10, and

























Table 6.1: Possible Outcomes of Integration of Individual Disciplines
We have listed the extremes, but assume that there will be no absolutes when
integrating the disciplines. It will be incumbent upon commanders to make subjective
decisions when applying the doctrine to operational problems. A key maxim of the
SOFIA doctrine is that the mix of disciplines will be based upon their strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, and their utility against a given adversary. SOFIA
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doctrine faces the same problem as joint doctrine. Maximum effectiveness is the goal, not
equal representation.
2. Utility Considerations
The individual utilities of each discipline can be used to complement the utility of
another. For example, SOF can provide physical access to remote or denied areas in low-
to-medium threat environments. AP can deliver PGMs. 10 can enhance the effectiveness
of PGMs through application of IBW. A possible result, SOF airpower may be uniquely
suited to deliver IBW enhanced PGMs in remote or denied territories. We are not
necessarily advocating the use of MC-130H COMBAT TALON lis as PGM delivery
systems, but there may be some application. It must be remembered that SOFIA doctrine
is not tied to specific weapons systems. It may be that future SOF aircraft incorporating
more powerful defensive systems and stealth characteristics will be capable of delivering
PGMs to remote or denied areas.
B. SOFIA DOCTRINE ROBUSTNESS
Applying the definition developed in chapter one, SOFIA'S doctrinal robustness
can be seen as depending upon its ability to function in a variety of roles, against a
variety of adversaries, in a variety of situations. It is measure of the cumulative utility of
the doctrine. When superimposed upon our "conflict visualization tool" from chapter one
(See Figure 1.1), we can see the areas in which our SOFIA doctrine will have the most













Figure 6.1: SOFIA Area of Most Utility/Robustness
The SOFIA doctrine will have applicability across the spectrum of conflict (low-
to-high intensity), and against both peer and niche competitors utilizing first, second, and
third-wave technologies. Areas of greatest utility will be those in which the U.S. cannot
bring to bear its technologically superior GPF. The SOFIA doctrine will be most effective
against niche competitors in low-to-mid intensity conflicts utilizing first and second-wave
technologies.
C. COMPARISON OF SOFIA AND GPF ROBUSTNESS
In chapter one, we stated our assumption that the SOFIA doctrine will have
relevance due to three factors: 1. Decreasing resources; 2. Shrinking pool of overseas
bases for forward presence; and 3. Increasing non-traditional threats/missions. In chapter
two we defined our vision of the future. At the beginning of this chapter, we projected the
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utility and robustness of the SOFIA doctrine based on our SWOT and utility analyses of
the individual disciplines. Comparison of SOFIA and GPF robustness further delineates
applicability of the doctrines, and may assist force planners in making resource allocation
decisions. Robustness ratings are subjective and based upon a relative scale of POOR,
GOOD, BETTER, and BEST (See Table 6.2)
INTENSITY COMPETITOR WAVE SOFIA GPF
LOW PEER 1 s ' WAVE N/A N/A
2Nb WAVE BETTER GOOD
3™ WAVE BEST GOOD
NICHE 1 61 WAVE BEST POOR
2NU WAVE BETTER GOOD
3™ WAVE BETTER POOR
MID PEER 1iJ WAVE N/A N/A
2
NU WAVE GOOD BEST
3™ WAVE BETTER BEST
NICHE 1 s ' WAVE BEST GOOD
2nu WAVE BETTER BETTER
3™ WAVE BETTER POOR
HIGH PEER 1 SI WAVE N/A N/A
2nu WAVE GOOD BEST
3ku WAVE BETTER BETTER
NICHE 1 a ' WAVE BEST BEST
2nu WAVE BETTER BETTER
3k0 WAVE BETTER GOOD
Table 6.2: Comparison of SOFIA vs. GPF Utility/Robustness
As displayed in table 6.2, the SOFIA doctrine will be most capable against niche
competitors engaging the U.S. in low-to-medium intensity conflicts. GPF will continue to
maintain its preeminence in combating peer competitors in mid-to-high intensity
conflicts.
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D. SOFIA BATTLESPACE SUPERIORITY
"Battlespace superiority" implies a position of relative strength over your
adversary that is achieved through the strengths and opportunities, and unique utilities of
SOF, 10, and AP. It allows the force that possesses it to maintain the initiative/upper-
hand. SOFIA induced battlespace superiority is bounded by the time available from
notification to employment of forces, by the relative information balance between
opponents, and the scope of the operation. "Scope of the operation" includes number of
forces involved, lethality of weapons employed, size of the area of responsibility (AOR),
operational goals and duration of the action. Changes in any of the variables will affect
the ability of SOFIA forces to achieve battlespace superiority.
While similar to the idea of "relative superiority", as developed by William
McRaven (1995) in his book Spec Ops, we believe that SOFIA induced battlespace
superiority has broader application. McRaven' s theory is based upon his analysis of
primarily direct action missions. Battlespace superiority takes into consideration factors





A Point of Diminishing Return
Figure 6.2: SOFIA-Induced Battlespace Superiority
In general the greater amount of time provided SOFIA forces to plan and rehearse
an operation, and to collect, process, and disseminate information among key players, the
greater the scope of operation they can undertake. There is a point in the time line though
at which benefits are dramatically reduced (See Figure 6.2, point A). The primary cause
of this effect is longer preparation times that may increase the chance of discovery of the
operation, and provide the opposition time to prepare. Information balance between
SOFIA forces and the opponent will be the key' factor in determining the scope of the
operation in which battlespace superiority can be obtained. Information superiority
reduces the SOFIA forces OODA loop. The reduced OODA loop allows the SOFIA
forces to maneuver their smaller ground elements between multiple decisive points. This
ability to move from decisive point to decisive point, faster than the adversary can, may
reduce the need for large numbers of ground troops. The close integration of 10 and AP
will provide the effects of the "missing'" ground troops. AP will provide mobility about
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the airfield and augment ground element firepower. IO/IW will increase the efficiency of
the OODA loop in the observe, orient, and decide phases of the cycle.
E. SOFIA-INDUCED SYNERGIES
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 summarize the results of our SWOT analyses conducted in
Chapters III, IV, and V. In Section A of this chapter we described the potential outcomes
of the integration of the individual disciplines, and identified the four instances in which
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Table 6.4: Opportunities for, and Threats to, SOF, IO, and AP.
1. Strengths and Opportunities NEGATE Weaknesses and Threats
The inherent speed, range, and flexibility of AP combined with the ability of
IO/IW to affect second and third-wave information systems from a distance, can negate
the limited organic combat power of SOF. By their nature, SOF possess little firepower.
Ground elements (including Army Special Forces, Navy SEALS, and AF Special Tactics
teams) are limited by the mission requirement that equipment be man portable. This
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limits them primarily to small arms. Air elements (other than AC-130H/U and AH-6
"gunships") are designed to transport troops, not to engage targets.
Conventional AP can supply the missing firepower of SOF. Fighter and attack
aircraft can provide air superiority and service targets designated by SOF elements.
IO/IW can attack the adversary's information systems, reducing the effectiveness of his
C2. Reducing the effectiveness of his C2 through IO/IW limits his ability to respond to
the action. Limited ability to respond to the action provides the SOFIA force the freedom
to conduct their operation.
The multilingual capability and cultural sensitivity of SOF may overcome the
ineffectiveness of the technological superiority of U.S. IO/IW systems used against first-
wave adversaries. The U.S. IO/IW technical approach relies upon the technical
superiority of U.S. information systems/applications. But as described in chapter four,
first-wave societies will not be susceptible to this approach because the information
systems utilized by those societies will not be reliant upon networked computers. In those
cases, the psychological approach will be most effective. But in order to successfully
implement PSYOPS against those societies, it will be essential to understand the people,
culture, and "stories." SOF provides this capability.
The opportunities suggested by UAVs and UCAVs may negate the high
OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO of both SOF and AP personnel. SOF and AP personnel
conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations. UAVs and UCAVs coupled with a
variety of information-in-war technologies may be able to accomplish the same missions.
Planned Tier 11+ (conventional high altitude endurance) UAVs such as GLOBAL
HAWK, or low observable Tier III- (low observable high altitude endurance) systems
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such as DARKSTAR will allow the U.S. to put a variety of sensors on target for greater
periods of time than traditional manned reconnaissance platforms.
2. Strengths and Opportunities MAGNIFY Strengths and Opportunities
The speed, range, and flexibility of AP and the impact of investigation of IO/I
W
capabilities/systems can magnify the strengths of small size, variable lethality, and high
state of readiness of SOF. AP can provide the mobility and decrease time lines for
placing SOF elements in position. IO/IW investigation of the vulnerability of information
systems can pin point critical nodes for attack, whether it be destruction or manipulation.
The small size, variable lethality, and high state of readiness of SOF allows the U.S. to
take advantage of the options presented by 10 and AP.
The ability of AP to optimally position ISR systems, and process and disseminate
collected information magnifies the strength of IO/IW to affect second and third-wave
information systems from a distance. Manned airborne ISR systems such as RC-135
RIVET JOINT or U-2, allows the U.S. to position sensors optimally to collect
intelligence that supports EW and IBW efforts. Near real time dissemination of this
information to decision-makers enhances the ability of the U.S. to effectively target
opponents information systems.
3. Weaknesses and Threats NEGATE Weaknesses and Threats
The threats of increasing volume of information and increasing the technology
gap' through modernization to IO/IW may negate the threat of inadequate C2 of SOF. The
greatest threat to SOF C2 is lack of information, and a poor ability to disseminate
information to appropriate decision-makers. While IO/IW is threatened by the ever
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increasing amount of information available electronically and the risks posed by
increasing the technology gap through modernization, these both may provide solutions
to the SOF C2 problem. Greater information availability may mean that their will be
more relevant information to be collected and processed. Increasing modernization of
U.S. information-in-war technologies may provide the SOF community with systems
better equipped to provide information to decision-makers.
4. Weaknesses and Threats MAGNIFY Strengths and Opportunities
The small size of SOF units limits organic combat power. The small number of
SOF units limits the number of operations in which they can participate. The speed,
range, flexibility, and ability to self-deploy of AP may be magnified by the
aforementioned SOF weaknesses. The small number and size of SOF units makes them
easily air transportable. The ability to move them by air means they can be transferred
from operation to operation quickly.
F. CONCLUSION
1. Suggested Historical Cases.
SOFIA doctrine is at the conceptual stage of development. The benefits of
widespread, planned, and coherent integration of SOF, IO, and AP have yet to be proven
in the field. A brief review of conflict during the twentieth century suggests several cases
that may prove useful in highlighting historical examples of SOF, IO, and AP integration.
We have attempted to categorize examples using a variety of variables that we have
highlighted throughout our thesis. Additional research would be required to either prove
or disprove the merit of each case for integration.
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Tables 6.5 and 6.6 summarize some examples that may warrant further
investigation. Table 6.5 highlights SOF, IO, and AP participating in primarily DA




SON TAY DESERT SHIELD
DESERT STORM
ROBUSTNESS
ADVERSARY "WAVE" FIRST/SECOND FIRST/SECOND SECOND
COMPETITOR NICHE NICHE NICHE
INTENSITY LOW MEDIUM HIGH
SCENARIO FACTORS
POPULATION? - - -
RESOURCES? YES - YES




RELIGION? - - YES






SOF HIGH HIGH LIGHT
10 MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH
AP MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH
TYPE OF OPERATION DA RESCUE DA/SPECIAL
RECONNAISSANCE
SOFIA NATIONALITY U.S. U.S. U.S./COALITION
OUTCOME SUCCESS FAILURE/SUCCESS SUCCUESS
Table 6.5: SOF, IO, and AP direct action missions.
Operation JUST CAUSE began on 20 December 1989 with the purpose of
capturing Manuel Noreiga and the establishment of a democratic government in Panama.
SOF were responsible for several missions in conjunction with this operation including
assaults on the Omar Torrijos International Airport, and the Rio Hato and Paitilla
airfields. AP assets involved included AC-130H SPECTRE, AH-6, F-117
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NIGHTHAWK, MH-60 BLACKHAWK, and a variety of tactical and strategic airlift for
movement of forces both inter and intra-theater. SOF forces included the 75th Ranger
Regiments, 4th Psychological Operations Group, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Air Force
Special Tactics teams, and SEAL teams (United States Special Operations Command,
1998, p. 19). Information operations included actions conducted by the 4th Psychological
Operations Group.
Operation KING PIN, the raid on the Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam,
began on 20 November 1970. Air Force intelligence photo interpreters had detected signs
of American POWs at the camp in May of that year. The raid itself was unsuccessful in
rescuing any prisoners, but was successful in demonstrating the competency of U.S. SOF.
Air assets included MC-130E COMBAT TALON I, A-l SKYRAIDER, MH-53
PAVELOW, HH-3 JOLLY GREEN GIANT, F-105 WILD WEASELS, and RC-135
RIVET JOINT (Vanderbroucke, 1993). SOF consisted of both specialized AP and a
ground element comprised mainly of U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers. 10 included
military deception operations conducted by U.S. Navy fighters simulating an attack on
Haiphong harbor to overload and confuse the North Vietnamese IADs.
Operation DESERT STORM included a variety of SOF, 10, and AP missions
encompassing DA, SR, and CSAR actions. DA and SR missions include the attack on
Iraqi early warning radars, and the hunt for SCUD missile launchers and C2 nodes. Air
assets included both specialized and conventional systems. SOF included USAF Special
Tactics teams, USN SEAL teams, and USA Special Forces. Primary 10 actions revolved


























TYPE OF OPERATION PEACE OPERATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS
NATION BUILDING
SOFIA NATIONALITY U.S./NATO U.S./UNITED
NATIONS
OUTCOME ON-GOING FAILURE
Table 6.6: SOF, IO, and AP MOOTW missions.
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD began in 1995 and continues to
the present as part of the stabilization forces (SFOR) deployed to Bosnia-Herzogovina
tasked with "peace enforcement (including separating the warring factions, establishing
demilitarized zones, and maintaining security) and support for the withdrawal of UN
forces from the former Yugoslavia" (United States Special Operations Command, 1998).
SOF are centered around both the Joint Special Operations Task Force-2 (JSOTF-2) and
the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). This operation includes
both U.S. and NATO country SOF. AP assets have included both specialized and
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conventional platforms. Notable 10 actions have involved EC-130E COMMANDO
SOLO, ground-based psychological operations forces, and perception management
efforts in an attempt to promote the missions of SFOR.
Operation RESTORE HOPE/UNOSOM II ran from 1992-1995 in Somalia with
primary missions of ensuring fair and adequate distribution of food supplies, and capture
of General Mohammed Farah Aideed. U.S. SOF included elements of the 5th Special
Forces Group, SEAL Team 1, and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. AP included AC-
130H SPECTRE and MH-60 BLACKHAWK. 10 actions were centered on a joint
psychological operations task force (JPOTF) that produced both leaflets and radio
broadcasts. After the failure of Task Force RANGER to capture General Aideed, U.S.
forces were withdrawn from Somalia.
2. The Next Step.
While "looking back" provides us with examples of previous SOF, 10, and AP
integration, only by "looking forward" will it be possible to "operationalize" the SOFIA
doctrine. In chapter two we attempted to identify and highlight some of the factors that
we feel will affect the operating environment early in the next century. Our summary of
these factors and description of the environment need to be expanded into three to five
scenarios and used to test suggested SOFIA TTP. This is beyond the scope of this thesis;
but we believe that this study has provided the conceptual framework necessary to
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